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1.0 Introduction1 
The place is alive with activity and the sound of 
hammers on metal. This is Kamukunji, one of Nairobi's 
more famous jua kali sites.!- Hundreds of artisans and 
their trainees are fabricating metal products -- brightly 
painted boxes, wheel barrows, charcoal stoves, cooking 
pots and utensils, and many more - for sale to 
wholesalers and direct to consumers. The place is hot and 
dusty, with few amenities. Most of the artisans still work 
without shelter, despite the addition over ten years ago of 
a few large roofed sheds. Less than a kilometre away is 
Nairobi's industrial Area, home to companies with names 
like Metal Equipment, Zenith Steel, New World 
Industries. Although the roads are breaking down, and 
the power supply is erratic at best, the factories of the 
Industrial Area immediately convey the impression that 
industrialisation is happening in Kenya. But is 
industrialisation confined to the factories? Or is 
Kamukunji somehow part of the process? 
This paper attempts to explore the link between clusters 
of enterprises, many of them not unlike Kamukunji and 
the industrialisation process in Africa. More specifically, 
the aim is to examine the ability of clusters to make a 
positive contribution to developing Africa's capacity for 
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Industrial activity. Original research has been carried out 
on two sets of enterprise clusters in Kenya, one of motor 
vehicle repair enterprises in Nairobi and Thika, and 
another of f i sh processing in the Lake Victoria region. As 
background for those studies, a review of secondary 
sources of information on clusters in Africa was 
conducted. The information was difficult to obtain 
because, like much African scholarship, it is more often 
contained in conference papers and consultancy reports, 
than in published books or articles. An initial attempt to 
gather materials by faxing requests to relevant 
departments in African universities failed miserably. 
What is reported is, therefore, the result of mining my 
own academic network. Not surprisingly, most of the 
studies reported are from English-speaking countries, and 
a disproportionate share of the references come from 
Kenya. Hopefully, as this paper is shared and discussed 
across the continent, additional materials will surfaec, 
enabling us to correct the errors and misconceptions that 
may have arisen from the imbalance of case study 
representation. 
The original research focused on two questions: First, do 
the clusters have the characteristics associated with 
successful industrial districts elsewhere? And second, to 
what extent have they been able to respond to 
opportunities and shocks in their environment? To the 
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extent possible from the available material, the paper has 
addressed the same questions in the review of the case 
study material. The analysis attempts to go beyond 
simple answers to these questions to explore the links 
between clustering and industrialisation. 
The paper is organised into six parts. Following this 
introduction is the theoretical discussion of the 
relationship of enterprise clusters to industrialisation. 
Then part 3 examines three clusters that, although they 
are at a very basic level of development, appear to be 
laying the groundwork for future industrialisation. Part 4 
analyses three other clusters that show unmistakable signs 
of actual industrialisation, and part 5 examines two 
clusters that could be called emerging industrial districts. 
The final section draws conclusions from the analysis. 
2.0 Enterprise Clusters in the Industrialisation 
Process 
Clustering appears to be one way in which African 
countries can overcome or ease some of the factors 
constraining their industrial development. Their 
contribution to industrialisation might come in two forms. 
Clusters can promote industrialisation by increasing the 
overall level of demand for goods and services produced 
by firms outside the cluster, thus enabling those firms to 
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grow and develop. Alternatively, clusters can foster 
industrialisation within the cluster itself by building the 
capacity of local entrepreneurs to convert raw materials 
into new products. It is this second route that is the focus 
of our analysis. Before attempting to establish the 
theoretical links between clustering and industrialisation, 
it is useful to delineate more precisely the meaning of an 
enterprise cluster. 
2.1 Enterprise clusters 
The term cluster is used in two somewhat different ways 
in the industrial development literature. Porter (1990) 
uses the term to designate a group of firms engaged in 
similar or related activities within a national economy. 
Although Porter (1990: 761) believes that the 
relationships within an industry cluster benefit from 
firms' being located near one another, he does not 
consider geographic proximity to be a defining 
characteristic of clusters. 
The second use of the term is explicitly geographic. 
According to Schmitz (1992), a cluster is "a group of 
producers making the same or similar things in close 
proximity to each other." It is, in other words, a 
geographic and sectoral agglomeration of enterprises. 
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This approach has its roots in Marshall's (1890) 
observations on the textile and metalworking regions of 
England, Germany, and France during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, which has recently been 
elaborated in studies of highly successful industrial 
districts in various parts of the world (See, for example, 
Piore and Sabel 1984; Zeitlin 1989; Storper and Walker 
1989; Becattini 1989; Sengenberger and Pyke 1992; 
Humphrey 1995). 
This study adopts the second definition, partly because it 
was conceived as part of a larger research project 
addressing issues of geographically defined clusters, but, 
more importantly, because geographic proximity appears 
to be particularly important in developing countries 
where poor infrastructure, weak information systems, and 
cultures that place high value on face-to-face 
communication are the norm. 
The discussion of developing country enterprise clusters 
tends to focus on how closely they resemble successful 
industrial districts elsewhere. This is a useful and perhaps 
necessary exercise, but not the end-point of cluster 
analysis. The many clusters that fail to measure up as 
industrial districts are not a homogeneous group, and the 
differences among them may well provide important 
insights into their potential as means of industrialisation. 
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Pedersen (1997: 23-24), from a preliminary analysis of 
African clusters, identifies four general types: 1) the 
diversified industrial cluster, based on the vertical 
specialisation of individual enterprises and the vertical 
diversity of the cluster as a whole; 2) the subcontractor 
cluster, based on a narrow vertical and horizontal 
specialisation, both of individual enterprises and the 
cluster as a whole; 3) the market town or distribution 
centre, which is horizontally specialised between sectors 
and also, possibly, within sectors; and 4) the specialised 
petty commodity cluster, with enterprises specialised 
horizontally. 
The breakdown has obvious roots in the African reality 
and, as Pedersen's (1997: 27) conclusions show, is useful 
in tailoring policy to a particular setting. What is less 
clear is how the typology furthers the analysis of cluster 
dynamics or the contribution of a cluster to the 
industrialisation process. Thus, although this paper 
occasionally uses the types to describe a particular 
cluster, the grouping of clusters for analysis will be into 
only two groups: those clusters that consist entirely of 
small enterprises with few or no links (o large firms or 
organisations, and more complex clusters tluit include at 
least some medium or large-scale firms. 
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2,2 Clusters and the industrialisation process 
The theory linking clusters to industrialisation hinges on 
collective efficiency which, according to Schmitz (1995), 
is the competitive advantage derived from local external 
economies and joint action. Put most simply, clusters are 
one means of building industrial capacity. Among the 
ways clusters work to increase productive capacity are: 
increasing market access, fostering communication and 
information sharing, facilitating technological upgrading, 
increasing efficiency through specialisation and 
diversification, and contributing to the development of 
supportive institutions. In short, clustering appears to 
have the potential to enable African countries to 
overcome or ease some of the barriers to industrial 
development. 
When firms undertake related activities in close 
geographic proximity, both the immediate environment 
and the firms themselves are likely to change. The 
environment begins to adapt to the presence of the firms 
by attracting customers, traders, workers with related 
skills, individuals and firms wanting to offer services, 
and still more enterprises anxious to benefit from the 
markets being created. Old institutions change and new 
ones spring up. Some developments happen 
spontaneously; others occur only when the firms in the 
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cluster take collective action. For example, traders may 
simply appear because they heard of the existence of the 
cluster, but government may have to be persuaded to 
improve infrastructure. 
As the environment changes, so do the firms. At its most 
basic level, clustering seems to encourage information 
sharing and opportunities for learning new techniques and 
designs. Sometimes firms then modify their own 
operations. One firm may specialise in some aspect of the 
production process while another turns from production 
to trade in inputs or final products. Still another firm 
may develop links with traders who visit the cluster. 
Schmitz (1997) highlights the two dimensions of 
collective efficiency: the planned and the unplanned, or 
the active and the passive. External economies are rooted 
in the fact that the benefits of economic action lend to 
spill over to other actors. The external effect is an 
unintended by-product of some other activity (Mishan 
1971). Schmitz (1997: 8) further argues that responding 
to opportunities and crises requires shifting gears from 
the passive aspects of collective efficiency (external 
economies) to active collective efficiency (Schmitz 1997, 
p. 8), Before discussing these in greater detail, however, 
it is useful first to consider some aspects of the 
environment in which clusters are situated. 
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2.3 Economic context for clustering 
Each cluster operates in a particular economic context. 
One would expect that the economic context, which is 
critical to the performance of individual firms, would be 
equally important to the growth and development of 
enterprise clusters. Three elements, borrowed from the 
industrial organisation literature (See, for example, 
Scherer 1980) and institutional economics (See 
Williamson 1985, North 1990, Langlois and Robertson 
1995) seem pertinent: the nature and size of the product 
market, available economies of scale and scope, and the 
institutions governing exchange relations. 
2.3.1 Nature and size of product market 
A cluster might be well-endowed and operating 
efficiently, but without a market for its products, it will 
die. Markets have always been in the background of the 
discussions of clusters and flexible specialisation, but 
they have not always received the explicit analysis they 
need and deserve. A full treatment of the subject would 
require another paper, so this discussion will focus on 
two aspects only: to the nature of the product and the 
sticky issue of market size. 
The nature of a cluster's products obviously has an 
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impact on they way they are marketed. Some products of 
small enterprise are inferior goods for which demand can 
be expected to fall as consumer incomes rise. Stoves and 
cooking utensils made of scrap metal, and rubber tyre 
sandles are two good examples of this type of product. 
Consumer, intermediate, and capital goods have different 
markets and require different marketing strategies. 
Perishability influences marketing channels. Many food 
products require special handling even after processing 
and must be brought to market much more quickly than, 
say, furniture or clothing. The relationship between the 
production process and the acceptability of the final 
product is another consideration. Some products can be 
made equally well by craft or factory methods, but 
others, especially traditional handicrafts, lose a significant 
portion of their market when they are machine made. The 
list of considerations could be extended almost 
indefinitely. The point to be emphasised is that the nature 
of a cluster's products has a direct bearing on whether a 
cluster is likely to industrialise and, if it can, how the 
industrialisation process needs to proceed. 
Market size, both the number of participants and their 
geographic spread, is also critical to cluster development 
and the larger process of industrialisation of which it is 
a part. The simplest conceptualisation of market size is 
that it is defined by the size of the local population and 
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the level of their purchasing power. By this measure, 
markets in Africa are small and access to foreign markets 
difficult. Small national populations, low incomes, poor 
infrastructure, and movement restrictions left over from 
colonial limes are among the reasons for small domestic 
markets. Weak distribution systems help to keep markets 
small and segmented in many African countries 
(Pedersen 1997). The lack of large a well-functioning 
wholesale trade system, or where such systems exist, 
their bias towards the products of large industry forces 
many small producers to sell their products retail or carry 
them to distant markets themselves. 
The problem of small domestic markets is one that has to 
be faced squarely by individual enterprises and enterprise 
clusters, but it is not insurmountable. Two broad 
strategies are available: firms can extend their market 
geographically, or they can attempt to capitalise on the 
smallness of the markets they face. The first option may 
involve expanding within the domestic market or entering 
foreign markets. The choice will depend on a number of 
factors, including the nature of the product, but generally 
speaking, broadening domestic market coverage is easier 
for most small-firm clusters than exporting. 
Barriers to entry into foreign markets include problems 
with the products themselves (poor quality, poor 
11 
IDSAVP No. 518 
packaging, etc.), the attitudes of the producers, and 
environmental factors such as poor infrastructure for 
exporting (especially problematic for perishable goods), 
lack of information flow, and red tape and corruption. 
Despite these difficulties, African industry can be 
competitive in some areas. The Regional Programme for 
Economic Development identified export opportunities 
for garments and home products in both the US and 
European markets (Biggs el al 1994, 1996). One of the 
case studies reported in this paper documents the 
challenges and opportunities faced by the Kenyan fish 
processing industry. 
Efficient small firms have another option open to them. 
They can attempt to capitalise on the small domestic 
market. Dawson (1992: 35, 37) argues that the small size 
of most domestic markets in Africa can actually be a 
boon to small enterprises. Where markets are small and 
relatively specialised, producers who can manufacture 
small batches efficiently can out-compete large firms. 
Markets are crucial to cluster development. Schmitz 
(1997: 11-12) underscores this point when he states that 
"clustering can give rise to successive layers of 
specialisation provided that the overall scale of demand 
grows" (emphasis in original). 
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2.3.2 Available economies of scale and scope 
The size of output is clearly related to market size. The 
entrepreneur who can reach a larger market can produce 
more, and can often gain more than proportionately from 
the increased output. This is the result of what 
economists call 'increasing returns.' The most familiar 
form of increasing return arises from scale economies, 
but at least as important, especially in situations where 
the market for any given product is likely to be small, 
are economies of scope. 
Increasing returns arise when an increase in all inputs 
leads to a more-than-proportional increase in output. 
Even when a firm could produce more efficiently at 
higher levels, scale economies may not actually be 
available. Available economies of scale are related not 
only to levels of investment in machinery and the 
opportunities for division of labour in production, but 
also to market size. At the level of production and 
investment, it appears that scale economies could be 
available to African enterprise in many subsectors. 
African firms typically operate at suboptimai size, even 
compared with those in other developing countries (See 
Table 2.1). Although some of the differences in average 
plant size between industrialised and developing countries 
may be due to factors such as the use of different 
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technologies, many African firms, including those in 
most of the clusters discussed below, appear to operate at 
an uneconomically small scale (Pryor 1972, Cortes et a! 
1987, pp. 21-27). This means that, if markets can be 
expanded, production can be increased and scale 
economies realised, 
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Table 2.1: Average Plant Sizes, Selected Industries 
High-Income Countries 
Industry 
Middle and Low-Income 
Countries 
N Average size 
(No. of 
Workers) 
N Average size 
(No. of 
Workers) 
Fabricated Metal 
Apparel 
Furniture 
9 
9 
7 
38 J 
43.0 
55.4 
9 
14 
15.4 
13.4 
4.4 
Source: Cortes et al 1987. pp. 22-23 
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Although the general distinction between craft and 
factor>' production is useful to bear in mind, it is also 
important to recognise thai in practice the two can be 
mixed. Sverrisson (1992a: 105) speaks of mechanisation 
being inserted bit by bit into the prevailing craft mode of 
production. First one process is mechanised, then another. 
At any given moment, the use of specialised machines 
is likely to be combined with the continuance of 
unspecialised labour. The result is a production process 
in which each artisan works on his own piece, using 
whatever machinery is available, but without 
collaboration with other workers, from beginning until 
the item is finished. One of the major challenges faced 
by entrepreneurs as their firms grow is conversion of the 
productive process from craft to factory methods. One 
way in which clusters ease this shift in the productive 
process is by permitting the division of labour to occur 
on a firm-by-firm basis, rather than within a single 
enterprise. 
Economies of scopc are present when it is more efficient 
to operate two or more activities in tandem than in 
isolation (Coase 1937; Storper and Walker 1989: 130-
31). Several types of economies of scope are available to 
small enterprises and. by extension, to enterprise clusters. 
The most common may be situations of concurrent scale 
economies, where the processes involved in producing 
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two or more products reach their least cost output at 
roughly the same level. Thus the producer of cooking 
pots may diversify into related metal products and 
achieve economies of scope even when the size of the 
market for any one of these products may militate against 
realising scale economies. Coordinative scale economies 
are available when integration of labour processes and 
regulation of material flows benefit overall production 
efficiency. A good example is the food processor who 
varies her products according to the growing seasons in 
order to keep her machinery operating fully throughout 
the year. Another, which emerges in one of the South 
African case studies, is the savings realised from 
marketing a line of products jointly. Economies of scope 
are also available from the sharing of technical know-
how and working skills from one process or product to 
another. The furniture makers who expand into making 
wooden crates and construction goods are an example of 
this type of economy of scope. 
2.3.3 Institutions governing exchange relations 
That institutions are important to development in general 
and industrialisation in particular is now generally 
accepted. A full treatment of the economic and social 
institutions governing the exchange of goods and services 
would take us far beyond the boundaries of this paper. 
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Nevertheless it is important to draw attention to two 
inter-related issues that arise in several of the cases that 
follow. 
The first is trust. Economic exchange will not normally 
take place without a certain measure of trust between the 
parties. Trust involves shared expectations of the outcome 
of a transaction. Humphrey and Schmitz (1996) define 
trust in terms of agents' belief that (he other party, given 
the chance to act opportunistically, will not do so. Zueker 
(1986) distinguishes three different bases for trust: (1) 
process-based, where trust is tied lo past or expected 
exchange, such as in reputation or gift-exchange; (2) 
characteristic-based, where trust is tied to the personal 
characteristics of the other party; and (3) institutionally-
based, where trust is tied to broad social institutions. S he 
first two types, according to Zucker. need to be replaced 
by institutionally-based trust when societies become 
larger, more socially heterogeneous, and more 
geographically dispersed. 
The second issue, clearly related to the first, is contract 
enforcement. Much institutionally-based trust depends on 
the existence of a third party prepared and able to 
enforce contracts and prevent opportunistic behaviour 
(Zucker 1986, North 1990). In Africa, however, such 
institutions arc often either missing or seem unable to 
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function. Survey results from Ghana suggest that 
enforcement of commercial contracts is problematic for 
two reasons (Fafichamps 1996). First, there is no 
mechanism by which information about defaulters is 
widely shared among firms, and second, the risks and 
uncertainties under which firms operate cause many of 
them to default on contracts at least occasionally. Firms 
have little faith in the legal system as a means of 
ensuring that customers and clients fulfill their contracts 
or compensate them for breach of contract. Rather, they 
tend to insist that customers pay cash, granting credit 
only to the most trustworthy. Firms protect themselves 
against problems with suppliers by inspecting goods 
before making payment instead of taking them on faith 
and negotiating afterward if quality is deficient. 
2.4 External economies 
Passive collective efficiency is essentially reaping the 
benefits of external economies. External economies exist 
when social benefits are higher than private benefits. 
External economics are the unintended or incidental by-
products of economic action. Schmitz (1997), following 
Marshall (1890) identifies three main types of external 
economies in enterprise clusters: labour market pooling, 
development of specialised local suppliers and services, 
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and technological spillovers. To these must be aCled the 
most basic of agglomeration economics: market access. 
Market access is the first and, as we will see, most 
universal external economy for clustered funis. The 
grouping of enterprises in close geographic proximity 
facilitates the meeting of buyers and sellers. In other 
words, it creates a physical market that can improve 
access to the overall market for a firm's products or 
services. Thus, once a cluster is established, market 
access is one of the potential benefits of locating within 
its bounds. 
Sectoral and geographical concentration of productive 
activities tends to create a pool of specialised skills that 
benefits both workers and firms. Such pools of industry-
specific skills arc evident in many developing country 
clusters (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994: 41). Whether they are 
also present in African clusters is a mailer for 
investigation. 
Clustering of firms also gives rise to specialised suppliers 
of inputs and services. The concentration of producing 
firms with similar supply needs attracts suppliers offering 
raw materials or components, new or second-hand 
machinery, and spare parts (Nadvi and Sclunitz 1994: 1 .V 
14). 
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Clustering also facilitates the diffusion of teclmological 
know-how and ideas. It does this by permitting the rapid 
How of technical information between producers 
operating near one another, and also by enhancing 
information flow between traders, producers, suppliers, 
and others connected to the cluster (Nadvi and Schmitz 
1994: 18). Given that one of the major characteristics of 
developing countries is their weak teclmological base, 
technological spillovers within a cluster could well be 
their most important external economy. 
Schmitz (1997) points to the down side of external 
economies. According to mainstream economics, the lack 
of match between social and private returns represents a 
market failure that affects investment. Specifically, 
external economies can lead to under-investment because 
of the lack of adequate reward for that investment. If this 
is true, then these disabling external economies may be 
a factor in the failure of many African clusters to grow. 
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2.6 Joint action 
Schmitz (1997) contends that local external economies 
may be necessary for the development of a strong cluster, 
but that they are not sufficient. What he terms 
'consciously pursued joint action' must also be present 
for industrial clusters to flourish. 
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Figure 2.1: Forms of joint action in clusters 
Dimension Bilateral Multilateral 
Horizontal Two cooperators at the 
same level in the 
production chain, e.g., 
sharing equipment 
More than two cooperators at 
the same level in the production 
chain, e.g. a sectoral association 
Vertical Two cooperators at 
different levels of the 
production chain, e.g., a 
producer and user 
improving components 
More than two cooperators at 
different levels of the production 
chain, e.g. an association or 
alliance composed of 
manufacturers and distributors of 
a product 
Source: Adapted from Schmitz (1997) 
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This emphasis on the 'joint action' aspects of collective 
efficiency underscores the importance inter-firm linkages 
and networks.-3 Schmitz (1997) identifies four categories 
of joint action in clusters, based on two dimensions. The 
first dimension has to do with the number of cooperators; 
the second, with the direction of cooperation. Thus joint 
action may be bilateral or multilateral. In bilateral 
cooperation, two firms work together as, for example, 
when they share an expensive piece of equipment. In 
multilateral action, groups of firms join together, often in 
an association or other organisation, for some common 
purpose. Joint action may also be vertical or horizontal. 
Vertical cooperation happens when firms involved in 
different stages of the production-distribution chain work 
together. Horizontal joint action refers to collaboration 
between/among competitors. The four types of joint 
action can be viewed schematically in Figure 2.1. 
Active cultivation of such firm linkages and 
entrepreneurial networks apparently contributes to firm 
growth (Barr 3 995, Alila and McCormick 1997). This 
suggests that the active cultivation of linkages within 
clusters, and from clusters to important external actors 
may contribute to the growth and development of the 
cluster. Whether the active aspects of collcctive 
efficiency are a necessary ingredient for cluster succcss 
remains to be seen. 
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Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that joint 
action has its costs. The opportunity costs of associational 
activity are probably the most obvious example. When 
businesses are very small, and joint action must be 
undertaken by the entrepreneur, he/she must carefully 
weigh the use of scarce time for attendance at meetings 
or other activities that do not bring immediate benefit. 
Joint action may also have political costs, especially in 
situations where the authorities frown upon grassroots 
initiatives. 
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2.6 Clusters and industrialisation: An analytical 
framework 
The discussion thus far suggests that clustering has the 
potential to facilitate the industrialisation both within the 
cluster and beyond it, but that such potential is not 
always realised. The collective efficiency that emerges 
from clustering can prepare the way for further 
industrialisation or, in some cases, turn a cluster into an 
industrial district. Yet we know that many clusters get 
stuck at low levels of production and distribution. A 
clearer understanding not only of clusters that have 
industrialised, but also of those that remain essentially 
small-enterprise agglomerations should provide insights 
into steps that entrepreneurs, associations, governments, 
and other interested parties might take to further the 
process of Africa's industrialisation. 
Preliminary analysis suggests that African clusters fall 
broadly into three groups (McCormick 1998). The first 
group makes its contribution by building a productive 
environment that, in some respects at least, prepares the 
ground for the emergence of collective efficiency. The 
second group of clusters already has much clearer signs 
of emerging collective efficiency. These clusters are 
already industrialising, but remain limited by the weak 
technology of most of the firms and the frequent 
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sidetracking of associationa! activity. The third group of 
clusters includes large as well as small and medium-size 
firms. They aim for wider markets, including both 
national and foreign markets, and are generally able to 
produce competitively. These clusters fall squarely within 
the industrialisation process, though serious challenges 
remain. 
Within each group, we examine each cluster's economic 
context and its internal operations. The contextual 
variables are three: the nature and size of the product 
market, the actual or potential economies of scale and 
scope, and the institutions governing exchange. Within 
the cluster, the analysis considers both external 
economies and joint action. A brief treatment of the 
general history and specific turning points of each cluster 
provides both additional contextual material and a sense 
of cluster dynamics. 
3.0 Laying the groundwork for industrialisation 
Many of the clusters studied to date, even those in 
developing countries, look very different from the typical 
African cluster. The footwear cluster in the Sinos Valley 
of Brazil boasted over 1,800 firms with an average 
employment of over 80 persons each in 1991, causing 
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Schmitz (1993) to name it a 'Superclustcr\ The firms 
included shoe manufacturers, subcontractors producing 
parts of shoes, producers of inputs, export and 
forwarding agents, and other related activities. Exports of 
shoes produced in the Sinos Valley were valued at nearly 
USS1.2 billion in 1991. Another cluster, in Sialkot, 
Pakistan, produces stainless steel medical, dental, and 
surgical instruments for markets in North America and 
Western Europe (Nadvi 1997). The Sialkot cluster 
consists of 300-350 manufacturing firms, up to 1500 
task-specific subcontracting units, and a variety of 
suppliers and service providers. Sialkot firms average 
approximately 20 workers each. The cluster supplies 
roughly half the global market for disposable 'floor' 
instruments, and around 10-15 per cent of world 
production of high quality 'operation theatre' instruments. 
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In contrast, most African clusters are hardly more than 
basic sectoral agglomerations consisting of hundreds, or 
sometimes thousands, of tiny firms, that operate at much 
lower levels of technology. They have few linkages 
within or outside the cluster, and their capacity for joint 
action is weak. This section examines three small-
enterprise clusters, all in Kenya, that are at an early stage 
of development. 
3.1 Garment production, Nairobi 
Nairobi has two large garment-making clusters, housed 
in City Council markets on the eastern side of the city. 
Most of the firms in the two markets are "mini-
manufacturers", i.e. small firms with limited division of 
labour, manufacturing for the market (McCormick el al 
1997). In addition to approximately 600 producers, the 
markets support traders in inputs and finished products, 
machine repairers, scissors sharpeners, transporters, and 
food kiosks. Although there are no formal financial 
institutions within the clusters, several NGOs offer credit 
to businesses in the markets. 
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3.1 ! History and turning points of (he Nairobi garment 
markets 
Uhuru and Quarry Road Markets were built in 1974 to 
replace older makeshift premises dating from colonial 
times. Quarry Road Market, consisting of three concrete-
block buildings, is in Gikomba. about two kilometres east 
of Nairobi's city centre. Uhuru Market, a similar, but 
larger complex of five buildings, is a few kilometres to 
the south. The clusters took their present form in the 
mid-1970s when the green grocers for whom the markcLs 
had been built moved out to less expensive quarters and 
were replaced first by second hand clothes dealers and 
then by producers of new clothes (McOormick el al 
1994).' 
Two clear turning points can be identified. In the late 
1970s businesses turned from retailing second-hand 
clothes to making new clothing. The products sold well, 
both in Nairobi and secondary (owns. The imposition of 
a ban on imports of second-hand clothes in 1984 
strengthened their position. The cluster's second turning 
point came when this ban was lifted in 1991 (Ongile and 
McCormick 1996).. At that point (he combination of 
increased competition and already slack demand caused 
by a depressed economy was a real blow to small-scale 
production. 
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in 1989 Uhuru Market housed 361 garment 
manufacturers, and Gikomba Market, 235 (McCormick 
1997). The premises, though clearly better than the 
outdoor sites of the jua kali metalworkers and carpenters, 
are unsuitable for garment manufacturing. Lighting is 
poor, electricity supply erratic, and business services 
lacking. The semi-open stalls are too cramped to allow 
for efficient flow of work and lack the privacy needed 
for new product development (McCormick el al 1997). 
3.1.2 Economic context for the clothing production 
Kenyan garment producers face complex markets. A few 
large-scale producers have managed to break into the 
export market (McCormick 1992, Biggs et al 1994. 
1996). Domestic markets can be roughly divided into the 
markets for general men's, women's, and children's wear 
and specialised markets such as those for uniforms, 
overalls, wedding dresses, etc. Each market segment can 
be further divided according to product price and quality. 
The domestic market for new clothes is constrained by 
the poverty and declining purchasing power of most 
Kenyans, the local nature of distribution systems, and the 
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availability of cheap alternatives. Average real wages 
declined by 57% in the private sector and 49% in the 
public sector between 1988 and 1994 (Kenya, 1995c and 
1992a). Unlike Zimbabwe and South Africa, Kenya does 
not have a national clothing distribution system (Pedcrsen 
1993, October 1996). Large chains of clothing retailers 
do not exist, and except in Nairobi and a few large 
towns, even small retail shops are few. This means that 
producers must either sell to traders who travel to 
specific 'up-country' locations, or go themselves to sell 
their wares. Naturally, this limits the size of the market 
that garment manufacturers can access. The market is 
further limited by the availability of cheap alternatives to 
new clothing. For poor consumers and, increasingly for 
those in the middle-income range, second-hand clothes 
compete with new ones for the family clothing budget 
(Ongilc and McCormick 1996). 
Economies of scale and scope are theoretically available, 
but may be difficult for these producers to realise. The 
mini-manufacturers averaged only 3.5 workers per firm 
compared with a developing country average of 13.4 
workers in apparel firms (See Table 2.1 above). Their 
total factor productivity (TFP) was also lower than any 
other group of garment producers in Nairobi. Both of 
these facts indicate ample room for realising scale 
economies. Studies elsewhere suggest that economies of 
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scope may also be available in clothing production 
(October 1996, Visser 1996). 
3.1.3 External economies in the garment markets 
The main external economies in the garment markets are 
market access and, to a lesser degree, the availability of 
intermediate inputs and services. Neither labour market 
pooling nor technological spillovers appear to support 
cluster activity. 
As in the previous small-enterprise clusters, market 
access is a major benefit to location in these clusters. The 
garment markets have become known in Nairobi as 
places where inexpensive clothing can be bought at either 
retail or wholesale. Particularly important, though not 
fully described, is the markets' ability to attract traders 
who will carry clothing to the smaller towns and rural 
areas (McCormick 1997). 
The markets have given rise to limited trade in 
intermediate inputs and have also spawned some basic 
services.-^ Gikomba has three fabric sellers and six shops 
selling buttons, thread, and other materials, Uhuru market 
has ten fabric retailers in the open-air market outside the 
main market, but clothing producers claim that prices are 
so high that they are forced to go to wholesale and retail 
34 
IDSAVP No. SIS 
shops in the centre of Nairobi. There are also mobile 
traders who bring cloth, scissors, buttons, and other items 
to the markets. Each market has several machine 
repairers, scissors sharpeners, and food kiosks to cater for 
the needs of the workers. Outside of each arc transporters 
ready to be hired to take products to market or transport 
inputs from town. Both pickup tricks and handcarts are 
available. 
Economies associated with labour market pooling and 
technology spillovers appear to be minimal. Labour is 
there, but entrepreneurs -- especially those involved in 
slightly larger enterprises -- indicate that the skill levels 
are uneven (McCormick el al 1997). The technology-
used is very basic, so there is little improved technology 
to spill over! 
3.1.4 Joint action among garment producers 
Firm linkages within the clusters appear to be weak. 
Despite the large concentrations of garment businesses, 
effective horizontal linkages are lacking. Some vertical 
linkages on both the input and supply sides exist, but it 
i.s not clear whether these ties lead to beneficial joint 
action. 
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Horizontal bilateral linkages are confined mainly to 
borrowing and lending of basic tools, such as scissors 
and measuring tapes, and the contracting of services 
requiring specialised machines (McCormick 1997: 117). 
One reason for the weak linkages appears to be lack of 
trust. For example, entrepreneurs interviewed complained 
that as soon as they develop a new design, their 
competitors steal it. 
Horizontal multilateral linkages do not exist. Neither 
market has a site association, and there is no sectoral 
association of garment producers anywhere in Nairobi. A 
group of medium-sized producers said they were 
interested in forming an association, and researchers 
encouraged them by calling two meetings, but idea was 
not carried forward (McCormick et al 1997). 
Vertical linkages with suppliers and garment traders exist, 
but information on the content of those linkages is 
scanty. Most firms buy cloth from wholesalers located in 
Nairobi's city centre. Some have established enough of 
a relationship with these wholesalers to qualify for credit 
(McCormick et al 1997). Although location in these 
markets offers access to the traders who frequent the 
buildings to buy finished goods, it is not clear whether 
such traders offer the producers anything beyond a 
simple market transaction. 
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3.1.5 Nairobi garment producers: Summary and 
conclusions 
Although these clusters use a simple division of labour 
that puts them squarely into factory production, they have 
real difficulties in achieving economies of scale. On the 
one hand, they face problems of market size caused by a 
weak distribution system, and on the other, they are 
constrained by problems of space and capital. Both make 
it difficult for them to produce cheaply enough to 
compete with second-hand clothes. 
Market access and limited intermediate input effects are 
positive externalities in the cluster, but they are not 
accompanied by effective joint action. Thev have no 
vehicle for negotiating with the Nairobi Oily Council, 
which owns their business premises, for improvements in 
basic amenities. Nor do they have obvious links to larger 
firms that might help in upgrading product quality or in 
linking them to larger domestic or export markets. 
3.2 Metalwork in Kamukimji, Nairobi 
Kamukunji is a large, busy cluster of tinsmiths, where 
nearly Iwo thousand artisans fashion a variety of metal 
products, including tin trunks, charcoal stoves, security 
bolts, cooking pots, griddles, bicycle carriers, and 
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wheelbarrows (Frijns et al 1997; King 1996: 55-57; 
Undugu Design Unit 1995; Haan 1995; McCormick 
1988). The cluster's location between the industrial area 
and the country bus station make it accessible to both 
supply and product markets. 
Most firms use craft based production methods and very 
simple technology (Frijns et a/ 1997). Fewer than 10% 
have the electricity connections that are essential to 
higher technology production. The majority use hand 
tools or simple hand-operated machines to make products 
of new and/or used sheet metal. Production processes are 
slow and products poor in quality. Workshops with 
electricity undertake welding, engineering, and fabrication 
work, frequently making to order rather than for the 
market. Their products include door and window grills, 
metal brackets, hinges, door bolts and latches, bicycle 
parts, and simple machines. 
The cluster is crowded and has little room for expansion. 
Access to water, sanitation, and electricity is poor (Hart 
1994, Frijns e/ al J 997). There is one common toilet and 
water supply facility, which often runs dry. Electricity is 
available either through the offices of the Undugu 
Society or from the residences in Shauri Moyo, both just 
adjacent to the cluster. Neither source, however, is 
adequate for industrial purposes. 
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3.2./ History and turning points of the Kamukunji Jim 
Kali 
Artisans working in Grogan, an area along the Nairobi 
River close to the city centre, were displaced to make 
way for a housing estate in 1978.-5 Most of the vehicle 
repairers moved to Ziwani (See Kinyanjui 1097) while 
other types of businesses relocated to Pastleigh and City 
Council land at Kamukunji. Some others moved to the 
Kamukunji site from nearby Burma Market.!6 The local 
metalworkers were joined by others who migrated to the 
area from Kisumu, Nycri. and other parts of the country 
to set up their businesses on the open land. In 1985 the 
Council gave them 24 hours to vacate the area, but the 
District Commissioner restrained the Council and 
allocated the land to the artisans temporarily, l ater that 
same year. President Moi visited the artisans and 
announced that sheds would be built and the land given 
to the artisans. The President also instructed the artisans 
to organise themselves into an association so that the 
government could better assist them 
This was a turning point, partly because the sheds 
provided at least a few businesses with much needed 
shelter from the sun and rain, but more importantly 
becausc of the new legitimacy the Presidential decree 
afforded the entire open-air small-manufacturing sector. 
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Unfortunately, this support, which was to be further 
developed in policy documents, was not well translated 
into practice (Kenya 1986, 1988, 1992b, 1996; Macharia 
1993; McCormick 1996; King 1996). 
3.2.2 Economic context for jua kali metalwork 
Kamukunji caters for a large low-income consumer 
market in Nairobi and up-country towns, and also 
supplies certain products, such as wheel barrows and 
farm implements, to agriculture and industry. There has 
been no systematic investigation of the distribution 
system for metal products of the type produced at 
Kamukunji. It appears, however, that clients are both 
wholesalers who will often buy similar products from 
several producers, and individuals (Frijns et al 1997). 
Most Kamukunji products are of low quality with few 
variations. The demand for such items is slowly 
decreasing as consumers gain access to higher standard 
goods from supermarkets and retail shops (Undugu 
Design Unit 1995). Thus, although the potential market 
continues to grow with Kenya's increasing population, 
the market's actual size may be shrinking. 
Kamukunji has the potential for realising scale 
economies. Fabricated metal workshops, even in low-
income countries, have an average of 15.4 workers (See 
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Table 2.1 above), indicating that the one- and two-person 
establishments in Kamukunji are probably economically 
inefficient. Realising economics of scale would, however, 
mean changing the organisation of production from its 
present craft form to one using some division of labour, 
This would, in turn, require standardising parts Jo a 
degree that is difficult to achieve with hand tools. 
Economies of scope, especially managerial economies 
and concurrent scale economies, should be available to 
these businesses. Realising such economies of scope will 
also entail changing the prevailing form of production. 
Contract enforcement is problematic in Kenya for reasons 
similar to those identified by Falchamps (1996) for 
Ghana. Artisans will, therefore, generally prefer to deal 
with persons they already know rather than with those 
who might no! only default, but also disappear. 
3.2.3 External economies in Kamukunji 
Kamukunji \s most positive external economy is its effect 
on firms1 access to product markets. The concentration of 
metalworkers in Kamukunji is well known in Nairobi and 
beyond, so it no doubt serves as a magnet for customers. 
The way the artisans display their wares suggests that 
they are conscious of the marketing role of the cluster. 
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The Association is also active in promoting members' 
attendance at trade shows, jua kali exhibitions, and 
provincial agricultural shows (Hart 1994: 4). The 
Association also attempts to offer assistance to members 
in locating new local marketing channels and is trying to 
establish a working relationship with the Kenya National 
Chamber of Commerce so that the Chamber can assist 
with exports to other African countries. 
Both private businesses and the Association have 
attempted, with varying degrees of success, to bring 
intermediate inputs to Kamukunji. Frijns el al (1997: 98) 
report that there are three hardware shops operating in 
Kamukunji thai provide nails, wires, metal strips, and 
other metal products. The Association tried a system of 
consolidated purchasing of raw materials from the large 
companies (Hart 1994). They sold them to the artisans 
with no mark-up, thus giving (heir members a significant 
cost break. The effort broke down, however, because the 
middlemen who had been supplying the artisans 
complained to the big companies that their business was 
being eroded. As a result it became more difficult for the 
Association to make direct purchases from the 
companies. In mid-1994, when Hart's research was 
being carried out, the Association was looking for other 
alternatives for obtaining raw materials. 
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Technological spillovers are minimal and confined to a 
small group of more sophisticated producers. The oldest 
artisans in Kamukunji were trained by their Asian 
predecessors in the ) 940s and 1950s.-7 Most appear to 
use the same skills and techniques learned then, despite 
some efforts on the part of the Association, the Ministry 
of Research, Technical Training, and Technology 
(MRTTT), and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers 
to provide seminars and exposure visits to local industry 
(Hart 1994). In general, Kamukunji exhibits little 
technological development. If anything, there seems to be 
a dampening effect of low-level technology that 
contributes to the inability of the firms to realise 
economies of scale. 
One exception has been the development of wheelbarrow 
production ! Wheelbarrow making started at Kamukunji 
in 1984. Artisans copied a wheelbarrow that they 
purchased from a Nairobi shop, then modified the design 
to make it stronger and easier to produce. At present 
about twelve different workshops make wheelbarrows at 
Kamukunji. All use the design developed in 1984, and 
produce the wheelbarrow in three different sizes. They 
purchase the main materials (iron sheet, pipe, flats) and 
weld (lie final product together. There is no job 
specialisation among the wheelbarrow makers, Each 
group makes (he product from beginning (o end. The 
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workshops attempt to standardise parts for their own 
wheelbarrows, but there is no standardisation across 
producers. Nor, apparently, has anyone tried to improve 
the design that is now fourteen years old. 
Potential economies from labour market pooling are not 
being realised. The very low skill requirements of most 
of the businesses mean that the main benefit from labour 
market pooling would be low labour cost. Most 
Kamukunji firms, however, have no employees so this 
potential benefit is not realised. Furthermore, the training 
system, when combined with very low barriers to entry 
in metal fabrication (See McCormick 1988: 55), appears 
to encourage the multiplication of tiny firms. 
3.2.4 Joinl action in Kamukunji 
Joint action in Kamukunji emanates from three different 
sets of inter-firm linkages. At the broadest multilateral 
level is the association which, in theory at least, includes 
all artisans working in Kamukunji. Next are informal 
groupings of firms making similar products. Finally there 
are the usual bilateral exchanges of tools and equipment, 
and occasional subcontracting arrangements. 
Associational activity among Nairobi's metalworkers has 
a long history. Artisans had an organisation that was 
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stopped by the colonial go\ eminent during 'Tiucrgcncy" 
of the 1950s.-4 After that, groupings were informal until 
early 1986 when the first self-help groups were formed 
in response to the President's call. The Ministry 
(MRTTT) encouraged the formation of such jua kali 
associations throughout the country, and of the grouping 
of such associations into national "associations of 
associations". This allowed the government to channel ail 
assistance to the artisans through the National Federation 
of Jua Kah and local associations (Kamukunji 1994; 
Macharia 1993: 24 ff). The umbrella association took an 
active role in policy dialogue, the allocation of plots to 
jua kali producers, and organising the annual jua kali 
trade fair until it became embroiled in a political dispute 
that led to its dissolution in 1994 (Haan 1995, Kinvanjui 
1998). 
flic present Kamukunji Jua Kali Association was 
formed in 1993. The MRTTT at that time requested the 
self-help group to become an association ^Kamukunji 
1994). By 1994, the association had approximately 850 
members, considerably more than ihe maximum of 270 
recorded by its predecessor self-help group (Hart 1994). 
In addition to serving as a conduit for funds, and 
carrying out the supply and marketing activities described 
above, the Association aimed to improve artisans' 
working conditions and provide them with access to 
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technical training (Kamukunji 1994). The association also 
provides services such as security — very important given 
lack of lockable buildings — and through its women's 
group recycles leftover scrap metal (King 1996; Frijns el 
al 1997). it has not had notable success in upgrading 
Kamukunji 's infrastructure or general working 
environment, nor does it appear to have succeeded in 
improving technology. 
The second type of multilateral inter-firm linkage is the 
informal grouping of similar businesses. One striking 
example, already mentioned, is the group of twelve firms 
engaged in manufacturing wheelbarrows. These, 
according to our informant, are now joining together to 
market their product, targeting especially supermarkets 
that have hardware departments. They have not yet, 
however, tackled the difficult issue of standardisation of 
parts across the group members. Furthermore, it is not 
clear whether this group is unique, or if similar informal 
groups exist in Kamukunji. 
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3.2.5 Summary and conclusions on Kamukunji cluster 
In sum, then, Kamukunji is a large petty commodity 
cluster which is realising only a few of the potential 
benefits of clustering. The cluster is well known and 
therefore provides access to local and national markets 
Some suppliers are located within the cluster, though it 
is not clear whether these have migrated in or are the 
result of specialisation among existing firms. There 
appear to be few technological spillovers. Even where 
they exist, as in the case of the wheelbarrow producers, 
problems such as standardisation have yet to be tackled. 
Economies of scale not being realised as firms continue 
to operate at uneconomical!}' small sizes. Kamukunji has 
a large pool of labour available, but it appears that most 
start their own firms rather than joining existing 
enterprises. Vertical joint action is entirely missing. 
Horizontal joint action is present in varying degrees. At 
its broadest is the Kamukunji Jua Kali Association. The 
Association suffers from some of the problems of groups 
initialed "from above" (Haan 1995). It seems to have 
been more successful in achieving (he aim articulated by 
the Provincial Technical Training Officer (i.e., bringing 
the artisans together so they can be reached by 
government initiatives) than in meeting its own 
objectives. In particular, the Association has been 
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thwarted in its attempt to undertake joint buying of raw 
materials and has been able to do very little to uplift the 
overall standard of the working environment at 
Kamukunji. The effort of the wheelbarrow producers to 
market their products together is an example of 
horizontal joint action on a smaller scale that appears 
promising. 
3.3 Vehicle repair in the Thikn (Kenya) Jua Kali 
ThQjua kali cluster in the Kigandaini ward of Thika, a 
town of approximately 72,000 people, 46 kilometres 
northeast of Nairobi, houses over 300 enterprises 
involved in a variety of activities. Research carried out in 
1996-1997 investigated motor vehicle repair and related 
manufacturing and trading activities in the cluster 
(McCormiek el a! 1996; Kinvanjui 1996, 1997, 1998. 
McCormick 1998). About one-third (36%) of the 
enterprises actually repair vehicles, an additional 8% sell 
spare parts, and 5% are involved in the manufacture of 
spares. The remaining enterprises manufacture furniture, 
various metal products, stove and lantern wicks, mops, 
cushions, mattresses, or are involved in retailing of scrap 
metal and food. 
All types of vehicles are repaired in Thika, but matatus 
and heavy commercial vehicles appear to dominate the 
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cluster.- Only hall (50%) of the repair firms say they 
repair private saloon cars, lite vehicles are most 
commonly between four and ten years old. though many 
firms said that they often repair vehicles in the U-15 
year age range. Newer vehicles are more likelv to be 
taken to the larger garages, cither because they are under 
warranty or because, in the case of accident-related 
repairs, they arc comprehensively insured (Kinyaujui 
1998). 
J. 3.1 History and turning points of Thika Jua Kali 
In 1988 the Thika Municipal Council required jua kali 
operators to move out of the town's main market. The 
Council chose Kigandaini. an area that had been set aside 
for a fire brigade, as the new juu kali site 1989, and 
enterprises began to locate there soon afterwards. Just 
over half of the present entrepreneurs had established 
themselves in the cluster by Ihe end of 1990. The 
majority (59%) were new enterprises, while the rest 
(41°.-o) were existing businesses moved from elsewhere in 
Thika town or other parts of the country. 
The cluster's two associations have different purposes. 
The Thika Mariko Jua Kali Association is primarily a 
welfare association, providing benefits to members in 
sickness, bereavement, or other difficulty; while the 
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Thika Welfare Jua Kali Association is a jua kali site 
association. The impetus for forming the site association 
seems to have been two-fold. At one level, it was simply 
part of the process mandated by (he government for 
becoming recognised as jua kali operators. In (his sense, 
the Association is one of those initiated 'from above' 
(l laan 1995). The association also appears to have roots 
in local initiative. Some of the operators who were active 
in its formation recognised (hat the site chosen for !hem 
had been zoned for another use, and that the difficult 
process of relocating might have to be repeated if they 
failed to deal with the land issue. To its credit, the 
Association successfully negotiated with the municipality 
to oblain ownership of the site. 
The site, as it was received from the Municipality, had 
no amenities. In the early 1990s, a delegation from the 
Belgian government visited the cluster and promised to 
assist with site upgrading. The Association and the 
Ministry of Research, Technical Training and Technology 
entered inlo intensive negotiations. After many delays, 
construction of some 66 permanent workshops finally 
began in early 3 997. To permit the building to take 
place, many businesses had to move to temporary 
quarters outside the main site. The building process has 
been on-again-off-again. apparently because of delayed 
payments to the contractor. As of February 1998, the 
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w o r k s h o p s remain r o o t l e s s . A n A s s o c i a t i o n o l l i c i a l 
e s t i m a t e s the a m o u n t s p e n t to elate to he in t h e v i c in i t y o f 
K . s h s . 27 m i l l i o n , w h i c h , in h i s o p i n i o n , is far t oo m u c h 
f o r the q u a l i t y o f t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
The major turning point for litis cluster came with the 
liberalisation of Kenya's import markets. Market 
liberalisation has increased the quantity and variety of 
both vehicles and spare parts. As far hack as the 1960s. 
Kenya had imported second hand vehicles, but their 
importation was stopped in order to promote local 
assembly of new vehicles. Then from the mid-l9S0s the 
government once again allowed imports. The first 
entrants were fully reconditioned vehicles from Japan that 
required little maintenance, at least initially. Then with 
the general liberalisation of markets, the range of 
imported vehicles was extended to include what have 
come to be known as the Duhui cars. These second-hand 
vehicles enter Kenya through the free port of Dubai. 
Since they are not reconditioned, many quickly develop 
problems requiring the attention of mechanics such as 
those in the Thika Jua Kali. Nearly ail (97.6%) of the 
firms reported that the repair business had increased as a 
result of liberalisation. 
Liberalisation has also increased the availability and 
reduced the prices of the spare parts that are the vehicle 
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repairers' main raw materials. There was general 
agreement (100% of those responding to the questions) 
that spares were both more easily available and cheap 
since liberalisation. On the subject of quality, however, 
opinions were mixed. Most (72.4%) felt that the quality 
of available spares had remained the same; the rest 
(27.6%) thought quality had deteriorated. 
3.3.2 Economic context for vehicle repair in Thika 
The market for vehicle repair in Kenya is highly 
competitive, and is shared by at least three different types 
of enterprises. Large, formal garages, mostly associated 
with the major vehicle assemblers, cater for new vehicles 
under warranty and serve the high end of the repair 
market. These garages offer diagnostic services, provide 
their own spare parts, sometimes offer replacement 
vehicles, and usually guarantee their work. Medium-scale 
garages, either freestanding or run in connection with a 
petrol station, service a wide range of private and 
commercial vehicles. Some are general garages, offering 
most services, while others specialise in particular repair 
types. Most stock spares, but also permit customers to 
purchase spares elsewhere. The final group consists of 
individual mechanics and the jua kali enterprises, both of 
which tend to specialise in a single aspect of repair, and 
to service older vehicles. 
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Thika town and il.s immediate environs probably have 
fewer than 1.500 vehicles in all (McConnick 1998). This 
fairly small market is shared by all of the types of 
vehicle repairers named above, including approximately 
100 jua kali enterprises in the cluster. Vehicles owners, 
especially those travelling regularly between Thiku and 
Nairobi, may also choose to have their vehicles serviced 
in Nairobi. 
Kenya's vehicle repair industry, like Ghana's, has 
developed a system of subcontracting that enables small 
firms to specialise in one or a few repair activities. 
Thika's vehicle repair firms, however, arc so tiny that 
there is probably ample room for developing scale 
economies within the subcontracting system, f irms in the 
Thika Jua Kali average only 1.6 workers per firm 
compared with a mean of 6.5 workers in Suame 
(Kinyanjui 1996: 8). 
The fact that some firms are running several activities in 
tandem suggests the availability of economics of scope. 
For example, it is not uncommon for an artisan to 
undertake wiring repairs, gas welding, and electrical 
welding. Even though these arc technically different 
specialisations, the need for them occurs often enough in 
the same vehicle to make the combination a useful one. 
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The subcontracting system involves complex social and 
market factors {Kinyanjui 1997). Economic factors 
dictate thai subcontracting will lake place, but trust 
mediates the choice of subcontractors (Kinyanjui 1(W8). 
When subcontracted firms fail to live up to their 
agreement, the contractor can insist that the offending 
firm redo the work, or he can deduct something from the 
final payment. In extreme cases he can sever the 
subcontracting relationship altogether. Since all of these 
sanctions involve time and threaten social relations in a 
close working environment, entrepreneurs would 
naturally prefer to do business with firms whose work 
and honesty they trust. This position is no doubt 
reinforced bv (he fact that neither the main contractor nor 
the subcontractor can count on the legal system or other 
institutions to support their claims, even when the claims 
are obviously valid. 
3.3.3 External economies in Thika Jua Kali 
Like most small-enterprise clusters, the Thika Jua Kali 
attracts customers who know they can find many firms 
ready and willing to perform the service(s) they need. 
Market access is probably the most positive form ol 
external economy available to this cluster. Over one-third 
(35.6%) of the entrepreneurs listed 'availability of 
customers' as the main advantage of being in the cluster. 
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informally trained (Kinyanjui 1997). The process for 
skills upgrading is also largely non-formal, consisting of 
observation and conversations with those who have a 
needed skill. As Kinyanjui (1997: 41) points out, 'There 
is a tendency of passing on bad practices...' Thus 
technology spillovers do occur, but the present system 
does not provide a mechanism for raising the level of 
what is shared. Unless this can be changed, technology 
spillovers, like labour market pooling, are likely to be 
disabling. 
3.3.4 Join! action among Thika's jua kali vehicle 
repairers 
Joint action in the Thika jua kali is horizontal. Both 
bilateral and multilateral linkages have led to effective 
action. Vertical linkages, on the other hand, despite the 
presence of manufacturers in the cluster, appear to be 
totally absent. 
The subcontracting system is at the heart of Thika's 
bilateral joint action. Firms have strong production 
linkages with other firms, and they recognise that being 
in the cluster facilitates these linkages. A large group 
(42.2%) of respondents identified these production 
linkages as the main benefit of the cluster, saying that 
their work 'is not done in isolation', that their work 
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'depends on other repairers', or that "they co-operate with 
other repairers" (McCormick 1998). Since firms tend to 
keep their subcontracting partners for some time, these 
relationships could form the basis for joint action in other 
areas of mutual concern (Kiiiyanjui 1998}. Whether such 
joint action actually occurs, however, is not clear. 
Other common horizontal linkages are unlikely to move 
the cluster forward. Equipment sharing, for example, is 
limited to simple borrowing of spanners and wrenches. 
Sharing of workers is occasional. Like the Suame vehicle 
repairers, most of the entrepreneurs in Thika have no 
communication with large garages (Kinyanjui 1997: 41-
42; 1998). 
The main source of horizontal multilateral joint action is 
the Thika Welfare Jua Kali Association. All of the 
surveyed entrepreneurs arc members, and all but one 
(97.8%) say they attend meetings called by the 
association (McCormick 1998).The main joint action 
taken by the Association was the securing of the land. 
This was an important first step in ensuring that 
businesses are not disrupted by forced relocations, though 
association officials recognise that aspects of the land 
tenure issue remain to he resolved, for example, the 
association now owns the site; individual entrepreneurs 
have the right of occupancy, but no right to sell, rent, or 
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bequeath their work space to others. As the founding 
entrepreneurs reach retirement age, the association may 
find itself under pressure to come up with some means of 
extending the present occupancy rights. 
3.3.5 Thika Jua Kali: Summary and conclusions 
The cluster shows strong production linkages. Small-scale 
vehicle repair is generally characterised by extensive 
subcontracting, and Thika is no exception. In the view of 
the entrepreneurs themselves, location near those doing 
other types of repairs is a key benefit of the cluster. They 
recognise and value their interdependence. 
The vehicle repair activities in the Thika jua kali cluster 
appear to be limited by the small market, the atomisation 
of firms, low technology, and inability to lake effective : 
collective action. The market for vehicle repair is fairly f 
small. This small market and the disabling effects of 
labour market pooling have combined to create very 
small firms that are probably not able lo realise ; 
economies of scale. 
how technology is another problem preventing the T h i k a 
jua kali cluster from developing into a higher leve l 
industrial cluster. One of the greatest needs appears to h e • 
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skill development. The present non-formal learning 
process in use to develop skills among practising vehicle 
repairers could be a model for skill-upgrading training. 
What appears to be needed is a way to bring new content 
into that process. 
The cluster's greatest weakness may be its vulnerability 
to manipulation by powerful outsiders, especially 
government and donors. The situation with the 
workshops funded by the Belgian government is a case 
in point. Encouraged by the promise of an improvement 
in their working conditions, the association welcomed (he-
Belgian initiative. Now. over a year after construction 
began, many businesses are operating in worse conditions 
than before while they wait for the promised workshops. 
Association officials recognise that they are unlikely to 
get all that was promised, yet they feel powerless to do 
anything about it because they believe that the Ministry 
entrusted with protecting their interests has derailed the 
project. If and when the workshops arc finally finished, 
the Association may face even bigger problems. Since the 
number of workshops under construction will allow only 
about one firm in six to benefit from the new facility, 
most Association members are likely to be very unhappy. 
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4 . 0 I n d u s t r i a l i s i n g c l u s t e r s 
The second group of clusters consists of a melalwork 
cluster in Kumasi, Ghana, and two vehicle repair clusters, 
one in Nairobi and the other in Kumasi. These clusters in 
many ways resemble the three already described, but the 
greater specialisation and differentiation of firms leads to 
bilateral production linkages and, ultimately, to higher 
efficiency. Higher level technologies in at least some of 
the firms set the stage for positive technological 
spillovers. Although Associations are present in these 
clusters, their activities sometimes gel derailed either by 
internal power struggles or by external forces. The most 
active associations extend their concerns beyond basic 
supply-side matters to markets and technology. 
4.1 Metal work in Suame, Kumasi (Ghana) 
Dawson (1988, 1992) described a cluster in Suame, a 
northern suburb of Kumasi. The cluster, known l oca l ly as 
'Suame Magazine' because its original site once housed 
a military magazine, is involved in two activities: 
melalwork and vehicle repair. The working population o f 
Magazine was estimated to be 40,000 in the mid 1980s, 
of which 8,000 were shop owning proprietors. These 
numbers do not include the spare parts dealers and metal 
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traders. 
Traditionally, the "Maga/inc" craftsmen were involved in 
vehicle repair, with a small number of blacksmiths also 
producing basic agricultural tools, charcoal stoves, and 
other simple metal goods. Out of this base of 
blackstnithing has evolved a group of firms involved in 
various types of metal-work manufacturing. All of the 
metal-working firms spend at least some of their time 
doing repair and maintenance work, but all arc also 
manufacturers. Dawson (1988) categorised them into 
three groups: blacksmiths who used clay and brick forges 
and hand tools, a middle group who had achieved a 
modest level of technological enhancement mostly with 
the use of locally made machines, and a group with 
machine tools, including at least one lathe, that he calls 
'engineering' workshops. 
4.I.1 History and turning points of Suattw mclahvork 
cluster 
The site owes its existence to the forced removal of 
businesses from the centre of Kumasi in the 1950s and 
1960s. The first turning point came wilh the retreat of 
Ghana's formal economy from the mid-1970s onwards 
when "even the least ambitious blacksmith added new 
products to his range or, at lire very least, increased the 
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volume of his production" (Dawson 1988: 27). 
Entrepreneurs saw vehicles lacking parts (hat could no 
longer be imported, and attempted to fabricate suitable 
spares. Others saw the need for food processing or 
agricultural equipment, and copied existing imported 
models. 
The market liberalisation of the mid 1980s was not 
uniform in its effects on the firms in the cluster. 
Declining markets and increased competition brought 
about the extremely low barriers to entry, drove many 
blacksmiths out of business, and reduced incomes for 
many others. Declining markets and increased 
competition also affected firms that had achieved modest 
technological upgrading, especially those whose products 
were significantly inferior to their imported counterparts. 
For both of these groups, therefore, the mid 1980s 
represented a sharply negative turning point in their 
operations. The engineering firms, on the other hand, 
fared much better. Their higher level technology enabled 
these firms to capture markets from both large domestic 
industry and from imports. 
4.1.2 Economic context for Suame metahvork 
Markets for the Suame cluster's products vary 
considerably. The holds and nuts, brackets, springs, a n d 
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agricultural implements produced by the blacksmiths 
have wider markets than die more specialised output of 
the engineering workshops. By ihe mid 1080s. both 
groups of products were competing with the blood of 
imports brought by liberalisation. Contrary to the 
expectations of many, goods produced in Suame fared 
well in competition with similar items from Eastern 
Europe and India. 
Suame metalwork firms have probably not captured all 
available scale economies. The average size for 
developing country firms is 15.4 workers (See fable 2.1 
above). In Suame, the first two groups of firms average 
approximately 5 workers, while even the more 
sophisticated engineering workshops have only 7 workers 
each.—5' This suggests that benefits from scale 
economies arc available for either individual firms or 
groups of firms to capture either by expanding 
individual firms or creating inter-firm division of labour 
through specialisation. 
The fact that all of Kumasi's metal-working enterprises 
spend at least some of their lime doing repair and 
maintenance work suggests the existence of internal 
economies of scope. Such work complements firms' 
manufacturing activities by enabling them to utilise 
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resources, especially labour, that might otherwise be 
idle. 
Enforcement of commercial contracts in Ghana is 
problematic, and this situation leads firms to prefer cither 
cash payments or dealing with known persons 
(Fafehamps 1996). Suame's smallest firms take deposits 
from clients, on accepting their orders, to cover the costs 
of materials. The greater a firm's output and the larger i»s 
clients, the less likely it becomes that it will be able to 
rely or, such prc-fmancing arrangements (Dawson 1988: 
33). 
4.1.4 Externa] economies in the Suame metahvork cluster 
As with the other small-enterprise clusters, market access 
is one of the major benefits of clustering, Dawson 
(1988: 32) observes that marketing is the metalworkers' 
greatest weakness. The firms make few efforts to 
advertise themselves and depend on informal contacts to 
spread their reputation. Obviously in such a situation, 
location in a place where they are likely to be seen and 
perhaps pick up some new customers who just happen to 
be passing by is especially beneficial. 
Suamc producers, like those in Kamukunju have 
benefited from the availability of inputs. The cluster has 
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'a large number' of traders of new and scrap metals 
(Dawson 1988: 11), Although some firms use 
domestically produced steel rods and a limited amount of 
new steel imported by individual traders, the bulk of the 
materials used in the cluster are scrap (Dawson 1988: 
31). As large firms began to be rehabilitated in the mid 
1980s, supplies of scrap increased, then decreased as the 
pace with which old worn-out equipment was replaced 
slowed. 
The size of Suame firms, which average 5-6 workers, 
suggests that labour market pooling might be more 
positive feature of the cluster than is the case in 
Kamukunji. Suame attracted two types of labour. The 
first consists of workers who have apprenticed in small 
firms, many of them in Suame itself. Most (80%) of the 
workers in blacksmithing and middle-level metalworking 
firms, and about half (52%) of those in engineering firms 
fell into this category. The second type of labour that is 
available in Suame has higher level technical skills 
gained in large-firm apprenticeships and technical 
training institutes, Although these constitute a minority of 
workers, even in engineering firms, their presence has 
allowed the cluster to produce some items that compete 
favourably with imports. 
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There is little evidence that technological spillovers were 
significant despite the fact that a small group of firms -
the engineering group -- was upgrading and benefitting 
from the Technology Consultancy Centre (TCC). The 
TCC helped engineering firms by importing machine 
tools and assisting in product development. Although the 
blacksmiths and artisanal metal-workers occasionally 
made use of products made by local machine shops, they 
themselves continued to use old technology and were 
largely unaffected by the technological upgrading going 
on around them (Dawson 1992:38). 
4.1.4 Joint action among Suame metalworkers 
Suame's metalwork firms seem not to have strong 
linkages with each other, perhaps as a result of the wide 
variation within the group. Whatever the cause, there 
appear to be few horizontal or vertical linkages. There is 
no sectoral association of metalworkers. Rather t he 
metalworkers are included under the umbrella of t he 
Suame Garagists' Association described below. T h e 
problem with this, as with site associations in general, i s 
that it is difficult for an association to represent well t h e 
interests of firms as diverse as upholsterers a n d 
engineering workshops (Dawson 1988: 46; Haan 1995). 
The metalworkers are similarly lacking in bilateral 
cooperation, A few of the more successful small firms 
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established contacts with larger firms through their 
participation in the 1983 Industry and Technology Fair. 
In general, however, such linkages are rare. 
4.1. .5 Suame melalwork cluster: Summary and 
conclusions 
The Suame metalworking cluster is large and diverse. A 
minority of firms is technologically sophisticated enough 
to be labelled 'engineering/ All of these use machine 
tools and most are equipped with at least one lathe. The 
rest of the cluster operates at a fairly low technological 
level. 
The analysis of potential external economics reveals a 
mixture of positive and negative effects. Being in the 
cluster facilitates market access and acquisition of 
intermediate inputs for the firms. Labour market pooling, 
however, has resulted in atomisation of low-level firms, 
rather than the development of specialised ones. The 
Technology Consultancy Centre, which might have been 
a source of general technological spillovers, apparently 
had an impact only on the small group of engineering 
firms. 
Linkages among Suame's metalworking firms and/or 
between these firms and others outside the cluster arc 
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weak. There is no association of metalworkers within the 
cluster, and little evidence of bilateral cooperation. The 
two firms with significant contacts outside the cluster 
were clearly exceptions, rather than the rule, in Suame. 
4.2 Vehicle repair in Suame, Kumasi (Ghana) 
Dawson (1988) also described vehicle repair activities in 
Suame. Kumasi is a major centre for vehicle repair, 
attracting vehicles, not only from other parts of Ghana, 
but also from Niger, Togo, and Cote d'lvoire. Suame 
started as a vehicle repair centre and has gained a 
reputation for cheap, flexible service. At the time of 
Dawson's research in early 1988, 52% of the firms in the 
cluster were involved in some type of vehicle work. 
4.2.1 History and turning points for vehicle repair in 
Suame 
Kumasi has a long history in vehicle repair. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, five domestic and multinational concerns 
located large garages in Kumasi. Until the early 1970s 
these garages dominated the local market for private 
vehicle repair. Magazine fitters, who were generally at a 
low level of technical skills, undertook only minor 
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repairs and conversions of lorries into passenger carrying 
vehicles. 
The first turning point for Suame came with the 1972-73 
budget, which imposed tight restrictions on the 
importation of new vehicles and parts (Dawson 1988: 
21). The large garages, which were very capital intensive 
and dependent on imported inputs, suffered, and small 
firms in places like Suame were able to move into the 
gap. Furthermore, economic mismanagement encouraged 
an active black market in vehicle spares. This broke (he 
monopoly of the large garages and opened up 
opportunities to small firms. 
From the mid-1970s, the range of clients and of the type 
of service demanded from small firms began to widen. 
Large and small, public and private organisations sent 
their vehicles for repair to Kumasi, because it was the 
only place where vehicle spares were consistently 
available. Vehicles were even brought in from 
neighbouring countries. Imported spares were obtainable 
on the black market and when they were not, artisans 
improvised. Furthermore, Suame repairs were also cheap 
because firms evaded minimum wage laws and income 
taxes. Since many of the artisans were present or former 
employees of large firms, the work was generally of a 
reasonable quality. 
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The boom continued, with minor interruptions, until the 
mid 1980s when the Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP) took hold. Reforms in the import and currency 
markets encouraged the importation of spare parts, 
vehicle components, and entire vehicles. Although the 
majority of the spares went to the large commercial and 
corporate garages, these garages did not regain their 
former supremacy. The corporate garages were busier 
than they used to be because the corporations they served 
had more vehicles on the road, but this increase in 
activity seemed not to have adversely affected the small 
firms in Suame. What did suppress demand for repairs 
was rising parts prices combined with a fall in the 
purchasing power of many vehicle owners. From the mid 
to the late 1980s nearly 70% of the sampled firms 
experienced a fall in demand and a sizeable number went 
out of business (Dawson 1988: 24). 
4.2.3 Economic context for vehicle repair in Suame 
The market for vehicle repair in Kumasi consists of the 
government, private firms and organisations, and 
individuals. Most of them (96%), however, described 
their customer base as consisting largely of individuals. 
The size of the market is a function of the number of ' 
vehicles on the road and their age and/or condition. The 
market for vehicle repair also has some geographic 
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boundaries, though it appears that the Suame Magazine 
has a wide reach, no doubt partly because of its location 
on the main road between two capital cities, Accra and 
Abidjan. 
During the 1970s when Suame established its reputation, 
the number of vehicles was shrinking, but (heir poor 
condition, the access of Suame to spares, and the 
availability of cheap fuel led to high demand for its 
services. After the introduction of the ERP. Ghana's 
vehicle fleet grew, vehicles were in better condition 
(though hardly new), imported spares competed directly 
with Suame-made spares, and some of the larger garages 
started operating again. 
The market for vehicle repair is highly competitive. 
Estimates are not completely reliable, but probably at 
least three thousand of Suame's reported live thousand 
workshops are involved in some aspect of vehicle repair. 
Add to this the few large garages that had resumed 
operations by the mid 1980s and small and medium 
workshops in other parts of Kumasi, and the result is 
intense competition. Most firms seemed to just wait for 
business lo come to them, but Dawson (1988: 25) 
describes two entrepreneurs who maintained linkages 
over a number of years with larger firms and state-owned 
enterprises which did not have their own garage facilities. 
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These were the only two firms reporting an increase in 
business in the 1985-1988 period. Apparently the links 
gave them a competitive advantage in Suame's otherwise 
deadly competition. 
The potential for economies of scale and scope in vehicle 
repair, as in other activities, depend on the nature of the 
work to be done. Vehicle repair is essentially custom 
production, with each job having its own character and 
specifications. Variations in required skills and in the 
equipment necessary to undertake different repairs 
encourage specialisation, especially for smaller firms. 
For this reason, vehicle repair, like construction, is 
characterised by specialised firms that interlink in a 
network of subcontracting (Kinyanjui 1996, Burrows 
1992). 
Certain types of repair arc highly capital and/or skill 
intensive, making it difficult to realise economies of 
scale, especially for a full-service shop. Inevitably in the 
full-service garage, some types of specialised equipment 
will lie idle much of the time. In Africa where capital is 
very expensive, firms — especially small ones - cannot 
afford to invest in machinery that is not fully utilised. 
Only the largest garages maintain ail specialisations in 
house. The vehicle repairers in Suame followed the 
pattern of specialisation. The largest group of firms were 
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the mechanics (39.5% of the enterprises); straighteners 
and welders were next (25.4%), followed by upholsterers 
(8.4%), electricians (8.1%). sprayers (7.8%), and others 
(8.9%). Their subcontracting linkages should allow the 
cluster to reap the benefits of scale economies, even as 
the size of individual firms remains small. 
Firms' exchange relations with suppliers and customers 
changed from the 1970s to the 1980s as a result of 
changes in Ghana's economic environment. During the 
1970s, much of Suamc operated on the fringes of 
legality. The firms, of necessity, used black market 
spares and, like many small businesses in developing 
countries, they failed to comply with labour laws and 
other regulations. When the new government that came 
to power in 1979 promised to attack corruption and the 
black market, many entrepreneurs began turning down 
work coming from government ministries and stale-
owned enterprises. By the mid-1980s, market 
liberalisation had reduced the need for black market 
spares, so on at least that front, the vehicle repair firms 
were able to operate more freely. 
Dawson (1988: 23) claims that small enterprise in Ghana 
had Traditionally' been heavily dependent on credit, with 
materials and parts often purchased and jobs done on a 
"pay later" basis. This also began to change with the 
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economic reforms introduced in the 1980s. As the 
government tightened the money supply, offering credit 
became more expensive and was consequently less 
common. 
Trust is not a characteristic of the vehicle repair industry 
in Africa. Throughout the period reported, firms showed 
extreme suspicion towards other workshop owners. 
Despite high levels of cooperation in the production 
process, the independence of each individual unit was 
jealously guarded and partnership or merging of firms 
was nearly nonexistent. 
4.2.4 External economies in Suame Magazine 
Market access is, once again, a major external economy. 
The concentration of vehicle repair firms brings 
customers. This apparently offsets the lack of advertising 
or other forms of marketing (Dawson 1988: 17). 
Suame has what can be terms disabling labour market 
pooling. Many young people train as apprentices, but 
instead of joining an existing business and thus enabling 
it to realise economies of scale, they most often set up 
their own business in direct competition with their former 
master. Suame's vehicle repairers manage to achieve 
greater efficiency than many small-enterprise clusters 
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faced with a similar situation. The subcontracting system 
enables the small enterprises as a group to achieve basic 
scale economies. 
The situation of intermediate inputs changed drastically 
with liberalisation. Before liberalisation, two types of 
inputs were crucial. The most common was scrap metal 
from old vehicles, which was probably readily available 
from vehicles abandoned as beyond repair in Suame. The 
other was black market spare parts. Without describing 
the channels in detail, Dawson (1988) implies that the 
Suame entrepreneurs had networks that assured them of 
a supply of black market spares. Since liberalisation, 
these have been replaced by three new lines of supply: 
"imitation parts" from Nigeria; relatively low price, low-
quality parts from Eastern Europe, India, and China; and, 
increasingly, parts made in the machine shops in Suame 
itself. These last include locally manufactured bolls and 
nuts, brass bushes, exhaust pipes, axle-shafts, and various 
body brackets (Dawson 1988: 23), These machine shops 
also recondition and/or manufacture parts on a one-off 
basis. The intermediate input effects are closely linked to 
market access in this case. When spares were difficult to 
get, customers knew that they would somehow be 
available in Suame, and this reputation for availability of 
needed parts attracted customers. 
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The small engineering workshops in the metalwork sector 
have contributed substantially to the technological 
capability of small vehicle repairers (Riedel and Schmitz 
1989: 147; Dawson 1992: 37-38). The ability of these 
small machine shops to make both machines used in the 
repair process and vehicle spare parts, he claims, has 
enabled the repairers using those goods to occupy niches 
thai would otherwise be beyond their reach. Not all 
garages have, or even need, higher technology. Dawson 
(1992: 38) reports that, although the engineering 
workshops are important, they are few, and most garages 
continued to use the same hand tools as before. What is j 
important is that the technology is present somewhere 
within the Magazine so that it can be accessed when 
needed. 
4.2.5 Join! action among Suame vehicle repairers 
The Suame vehicle repair cluster is characterised by 
extensive horizontal subcontracting linkages as well as by : 
vertical linkages with the engineering firms producing 
spare parts. Subcontracting has linked small firms within 
Suame, and resulted in joint production. Although the 
Suame Magazine was begun by former employees of 
large firms, there is little contact between these large 
firms and Suame's small garages. 
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Strong vertical bilateral linkages between garages and 
metalworkers, mostly the engineering firms, lead to what 
could be termed joint production. A mechanic in need of 
a part goes to an engineering workshop carrying the old 
part. The workshop may either rework the existing part 
or make a new one using the old as a model. The 
mechanic then fits the part and continues with the rest of 
the repair job. 
The Ministry of industries created the Suame Garages 
Association in 1983 to act as a two-way communication 
channel between government and artisans, as well as a 
delivery channel for programmes of assistance (Dawson 
1988: 46). At the time of the research the Association 
was helping to select enterprises which were to benefit 
from a World Bank transport sector crcdit line. It was 
also involved in nominating candidates for courses at the 
National Vocational Training Institute and Management 
Development and Productivity Institute. In both instances, 
the Association was having difficulties. This may be, as 
Dawson suggests, because the Association represents too 
wide a diversity of trades and activities with firms of too 
many sizes and types. It may also be that the Association, 
as a creation of Government, lacks legitimacy and the 
support of its members. 
77 
IDSAVi' No. 518 
4.2.6 Suame vehicle repair cluster: Summary and 
conclusions 
Despite a growing market and fairly impressive 
technological capability in some of its engineering 
workshops, most firms experienced a fall in demand and 
many went out of business. Dawson (1988: 24) rightly 
observes that Suame may be a victim of its own success. 
Its reputation as a thriving centre for small-scale 
enterprise attracts trainees and potential entrepreneurs in 
large numbers, with the result that most end up in 
enterprises too small to be efficient. 
Linkages between metal work manufacturers and vehicle 
repair firms within Suame have probably helped the 
cluster to do as well as it has, but they have not been 
strong enough to enable it to weather the cutthroat 
competition that has developed. The skills developed in 
the engineering workshops when spares were difficult to 
obtain continue to serve the cluster well, because the 
existence of the local workshops enable vehicle repairers 
lo take on jobs diat would otherwise have to be done in 
one of the large garages. There is some indication (only 
2 firms!) that linkages between small and large firms are 
important (See Alila and McCormick 1997). The lesson 
here may, however, not lie in the linkage. Rather, the 
important point may be that these two firms developed 
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active marketing strategies that enabled them to avoid 
cut-throat competition that was enmeshing most of t 
counterparts. The Suame Garagists' Association, on 
other hand, does not appear to have taken signifn 
joint action. Government and donors have plan 
assistance packages without adequate consultation, 
the small vehicle repairers seem unable to organise 
their effective use. 
4.3 Vehicle repair in Ziwani (Kenya) 
Ziwani is a cluster in the Eastlands of Nairobi. At 
time of the research in 1996-97, the cluster had 
enterprises crowded into a 1,2-acre site. All were sn 
and all were engaged in vehicle repair or spare p 
manufacture (McCormick ei al 1996). 
Working spaces within the cluster are allocated on 
basis of eleven named specialisations. According 
Kinyanjui (1997), general mechanics represent the far, 
proportion of Ziwani repairers (22.4% of the toi 
followed closely by panel beaters (20.2%), spray pain 
(18.2%), vehicle wiring specialists (18.2%), and gas 
electrical welders (8.1%). Four other specialisati 
account for only 12.9% of the e n t e r p r i s e s . — ^ 
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active marketing strategies that enabled them to avoid the 
cut-throat competition that was enmeshing most of their 
counterparts. The Suame Garagists' Association, on the 
other hand, does not appear to have taken significant 
joint action. Government and donors have planned 
assistance packages without adequate consultation, and 
the small vehicle repairers seem unable to organise for 
their effective use. 
4.3 Vehicle repair in Ziwani (Kenya) 
Ziwani is a cluster in the Eastlands of Nairobi. At the 
time of the research in 1996-97, the cluster had 506 
enterprises crowded into a 1,2-acre site. All were small, 
and all were engaged in vehicle repair or spare parts 
manufacture (McCormick et al 1996). 
Working spaces within the cluster are allocated on the 
basis of eleven named specialisations. According to 
Kinyanjui (1997), general mechanics represent the largest 
proportion of Ziwani repairers (22.4% of the total), 
followed closely by panel beaters (20.2%), spray painters 
(18.2%), vehicle wiring specialists (18.2%), and gas and 
electrical welders (8.1%). Four other specialisations 
account for only 12.9% of the enterprises.-^ 
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All types of vehicles are repaired in Ziwani. All firms 
report repairing heavy lorries, 97.0% repair matcttus, and 
94.9% repair private saloon cars. The vehicles are mostly 
over six years old, and many firms said that they often 
repair vehicles in the 16-20 year age range. In Nairobi as 
in Thika, newer vehicles are more likely to be repaired 
in the large formal garages. 
4.3.1 History and turning points 
Ziwani shares part of its history with Kamukunji. The 
cluster was founded by entrepreneurs relocated from 
other parts of Nairobi in 1972 (Kinyanjui 1996:14-15). 
There was another influx of artisans from the Grogan site 
in 1978 and a spurt of firm formation in 1989-90. These 
combined with a rather steady pattern of new business 
startups to bring the total to its present 500+ enterprises. 
The cluster has experienced two major turning points. 
The first coincided with the 1985 legitimation of the jua 
kali. The President's action and the resulting changes in 
attitudes brought about growth and improved 
infrastructure in Ziwani cluster. Ziwani was also one of 
the early beneficiaries of the Kenya Government's duct 
Kali Shed Programme described earlier. The second 
turning point came with market liberalisation and the 
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accompanying massive importing of second-hand vehicles 
and spare parts. 
4.3.2 Economic context for Ziwani vehicle repair 
As in Thika, the market for vehicle repair is shared by 
the large formal garages, medium-scale garages, and 
small shops including the jua kali enterprises. Also 
similar to Thika is the concentration of the J A kali 
clusters on the repair of older vehicles. Heavy 
commercial vehicles and matatus predominate, but nearly 
all firms in Ziwani also repair private saloon cars. 
The overall market for vehicle repair is much larger in 
Nairobi than in Thika. Nairobi's population, estimated at 
1.8 million in 1996, extrapolates to a vehicle population 
of at least 27,000. The fact that Nairobi is the industrial 
and commercial capital of Kenya as well as its political 
capital suggests that the vehicle population may actually 
be much higher. Of course, the population of mechanics 
is also considerably larger, and without a full census it is 
difficult to estimate the degree of market saturation. 
Most Ziwani vehicle repairers (78.1%) specialise in only 
one of the eleven repair types. The rest undertake 
between two and four different repair activities. As in 
Thika, some of the combinations appear to fit together 
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and are often stages of a single repair job. This happens, 
for example, when a firm specialising in panel beating 
also does spray painting and/or welding, or a wiring 
specialist also does welding. Such combinations may 
result in economies of scope, especially in cases where 
there is not enough demand to permit a firm to expand 
with a single specialisation. Welding seems to be a case 
in point. Well over half (61.3%) of those specialising in 
welding take on other types of repairs, including spray 
painting, panel beating, body work, and exhaust system 
repairs. 
Ziwani firms, with a mean of only 1.5 workers, are more 
like the firms in Thika than those in Suame, Kumasi, 
which average 6.5 workers (Kinyanjui 1996). This 
suggests that there may be unrealised economies of scale 
in Ziwani. 
Contract enforcement is important in Ziwani, because of 
the extensive use of subcontracting. When the 
subcontractor defaults or fails to perform to the required 
standard, the main contractor may handle the problem 
himself or the contract parties can request the Association 
to arbitrate. The Association's willingness to enter into 
the tole of arbiter of disputes between member firms is 
an important step towards institution building. By 
providing sanctions for firms that attempt to act 
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opportunistically, the Ziwani association is reducing the 
risks of doing business and strengthening the overall 
business environment. Trust remains a key factor in the 
selection of subcontract firms, but the development of a 
mediation process allows firms to move from process-
and/or characteristic-based trust towards institutionally-
based trust. 
4.3.3 External economies 
As with most small-enterprise clusters, (he geographical 
concentration in Ziwani brings major benefits in the form 
of market access. Kinyanjui (1997) reports that nearly 
half (46.1%) of customers simply arrive al the repairer's 
place of work. The rest are brought by other customers 
(40.4%) or by friends (13.5%). When asked the 
advantages of being in the cluster, ail of the businesses 
named 'availability of customers' either first or second. 
Three-quarters (75.5%) of the entrepreneurs in Ziwani 
had no occupation before starting their present business 
a n d a sizeable majority (69.9%) of the artisans were 
trained in Ziwani itself (Kinyanjui 1997, 1998). These 
facts suggest that, like Suame and Thika, Ziwani could 
su f fe r from disabling labour market pooling . Closer 
investigation, however, shows that relatively few firms 
a r e the recent start-ups one would expect to find if young 
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people were starting firms in Ziwani immediately after 
training. The firms that were founded in 1991 or later 
(14% of the total) are hardly enough to cause a major 
competitive threat to existing entrepreneurs. 
Ziwani includes 30 manufacturing firms producing 
vehicle parts, machines, and household goods 
(McCormick el a! 1996). The vehicle parts manufactured 
include silencers, rubber bushes, chassis, and car seat 
cushions. The two spares shops run by the Association 
stock these local manufactures as well as other imported 
or domestic spares. Despite the presence of shops in the 
cluster, three-quarters (75.8%) of the repairers buy spares 
on Kirinyaga Road, an area known for its high 
concentration of auto spares shops, and half (50.5%) 
purchase some spares in the industrial area. All in ail, 
autospares are readily available to Ziwani firms. 
In general, Ziwani's potential for technological spillovers 
is very similar to that of Thika. Vehicle repairers readily 
share ideas and information about repair procedures, but 
what they share is limited by their lack of current 
technical knowledge. The choice of Ziwani by (he United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UN I DO) 
for its training facility offers the potential at least for 
technological upgrading. UNI DO sponsored the building 
of a training facility for skill development and also 
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provided equipment for use in Ziwani. The building was 
originally projected to have been completed by July 
1997, but is now, according to an informant, unlikely to 
be ready before July 1998 
4.3.4 Joint action 
As with vchiclc repair elsewhere, the subcontracting 
system in Ziwani gives rise to horizontal linkages among 
small firms with different specialisations. Almost all 
(99.0%) of the firms subcontracted work out, and an 
equally high proportion reported receiving subcontracts 
(Kinyanjui 1998). Subcontracting relationships arc Song 
lasting. Over one quarter of the enterprises (26.8%) said 
that they never change subcontractors, while more than 
half (59.8%) said that they change only infrequently. 
Other bilateral linkages are weak or non-existent. 
Approximately one-quarter (24.7%) of the Ziwani firms 
reported exchanging equipment with other enterprises 
(McCormick et al 1996). There may be somewhat less 
bilateral sharing than in other clusters because the 
Association has purchased some items that it makes 
available to members. Like their counterparts in Thika, 
Ziwani entrepreneurs have few links with vehicle 
assemblers or large-scale garages ( Kinyanjui 1998). 
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Ziwani entrepreneurs have strong multilateral linkages 
through their association, Ziwani Jua Kali Association. 
All (100%) enterprises in Ziwani are members. The 
association is involved in the general management and 
administration of the cluster (Kinyanjui 1996: 15-16). 
As already described, the association acts as a mediator 
in disputes between member enterprises. The association 
is also attempting to improve the image of the cluster by 
strengthening general discipline within and around the 
site and by taking measures to control theft and the sale 
of stolen vehicle parts. This is being done, according to 
Association officials, in order to make the cluster more 
attractive to potential customers. 
The association has undertaken several other specific 
joint actions. To ensure security of tenure for the 
enterprises, it purchased the Ziwani site from the Nairobi 
City Council. This has been a very positive move, as it 
has provided the present businesses with secure, business 
premises. The Association has also purchased industrial 
gas cylinders which it makes available to members, thus 
rsdusiog their capital costs. In 1997, the Association 
enabled members to obtain Kenya's new identification 
cards with minimum effort, by arranging for registration 
to be carried out at the Ziwani site. 
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The Ziwani association is not without its problems. Two 
years ago the secretary absconded with a large sum of 
money, leaving the members demoralised. The present 
leadership appears to be honest, but it has not been 
successful in all its undertakings. Despite improvements 
in organisation, Ziwani still has a clear jua kali image 
that frightens away many potential customers. The 
Association is also engaged in a dispute over the land 
that is taking a considerable amount of the officials' 
time. In an important effort at future planning, the 
Association applied for a bank loan to enable it to 
purchase diagnostic equipment and large replacement 
parts (doors, plastic bumpers, etc.) For repairing the 
Dubai cars. When the application was refused on the 
grounds that the Association had no legal standing to 
borrow, the officials turned to the Government for help. 
Here also they were rebuffed. It seems that MRTTT sees 
these businesses as jua kali who should not aspire to high 
technology. The association is now looking for assistance 
to write a proposal for funds to buy the equipment on ils 
own. 
4 3.5 Ziwani motor mechanics: Summary and conclusions 
Currently the main external economy available to the 
Ziwani vehicle repair cluster is market access. The 
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atmosphere is ripe for positive technological spillovers, 
but neither the promised training programme nor the 
high-tech equipment needed for diagnosing and repairing 
new vehicles appear to be forthcoming. 
The strength of the cluster is in its linkages. Like its 
counterparts in Thika and Suame, the cluster is 
characterised by strong production linkages. Nearly all of 
the firms give and receive subcontracts. Much 
subcontracting is a sharing of work based on firm 
specialisations, but a small proportion represents sharing 
of jobs within a given specialisation, usually because an 
entrepreneur has more work than he can handle. As a 
result Ziwani's artisans seem to be able to work 
efficiently enough to compete in Nairobi's vehicle repair 
market. Nevertheless, the fact remains that these 
enterprises are very tiny, even compared with other 
African vehicle repairers. The issue of mergers or other 
types of combinations to achieve greater scale economies 
did not come up in this research. It should, perhaps, be 
pursued at a later date. 
The Ziwani .Jua Kali Association has followed through 
on the difficult process of purchasing the Ziwani site, and 
is now seeking funds to enable the cluster to invest in 
new techno logy .-'It is this last effort that may prove most 
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telling. If they can obtain the equipment and related 
training to enable them to enter successfully into the 
market for repair of the current generation of vehicles, 
the jua kali will have reached a new level of 
acceptability and integration into the process of Kenyan 
industrialisation. 
The cluster repairs all types of vehicles. This means that 
its market is potentially as wide as Nairobi. In fact, most 
vehicles presently repaired in Ziwani are old even by 
Kenyan standards. Association officials believe that, to 
attract the owners of newer vehicles, the cluster will 
require both technological upgrading and an improved 
image. Recognition of the need to attract customers is 
one thing that sets the Ziwani Association apart from 
most small-enterprise associations. It is a positive 
development that needs to be nurtured and supported. 
5 .0 E m e r g i n g I n d u s t r i a l D i s t r i c t s 
Clusters that either include medium or large firms, or 
have clear links to such firms or to other larger 
organisations appear to be rare in Africa. The secondary 
literature yielded only two clear examples of clusters 
lilting this description. Both are in South Africa, and 
both produce garments. One, the Western Cape clothing 
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cluster, was well described and is included here. The 
third example, Kenya's Lake Victoria fish processing 
industry, comes from our own research. 
5.1 The clothing industry in the Western Cape (South 
Africa) 
South Africa's Western Cape accounts for 45% of local 
clothing production and half of the country's total 
clothing exports. It also dominates the production of 
higher-quality, 'fashion' clothing (Wilkens and Kane 
1997). October (1996: 17) argues that the proximity of 
retailers and manufacturing in the Western Cape is the 
cluster's most important feature. He believes that the 
presence of the large retailers and the manufacturers' 
almost total reliance on these distribution channels has 
affected the size and structure of the firms in the 
industry, the state of the region's design capacity, its 
quality standards, and the development of highly 
dependent subcontracting and marketing relationships. 
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Table 5.1: Western Cape Clothing 
Factories 
Year Factories Employees 
1935 30 3,500 
1940 40 4,772 
1950 104 13,204 
1960 166 19,787 
1970 253 37,743 
1980 332 53,421 
1990 433 54,267 
1994 538 46,868 
Source: October 1996: 6 
5.1.1 History and turning points of the Western Cape 
clothing cluster 
Until the 1920s clothing in South Africa was either 
imported or tailored (October 1996). Although the history 
of the cluster is not very clear in the available literature, 
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its appearance in the Western Cape seems to be 
associated with the development of the textile industry 
there. Whatever the original impetus was, the cluster has 
grown from 30 factories employing 3,500 workers in 
1935, to over 500 factories with 47,000 workers in 1994 
(See Table 5.1). 
The data in Table 5.1 suggest two turning points in the 
history of the Western Cape clothing cluster. The first 
was in the 1940s when the number of factories and 
workers nearly tripled. October (1996) mentions supply 
restrictions during World War 1. No doubt imported 
clothing was similarly difficult to get during World War 
11, and may account for this major expansion in the 
domestic clothing industry. The cluster continued to 
expand steadily for the next three decades. Employment 
nearly doubled during the 1960s, and increased by 42% 
in the 1970s. By the 1980s, however, growth slowed. The 
1990s have witnessed a drop in total employment despite 
increases both in the number of firms and in exports. 
October (1996: 6-7) explains the latest turning point in 
terms of the opening up of the South African economy. 
The decline in production, he believes, was mainly due 
to an increase in imports of new and second-hand 
clothing. After a small improvement between 1993 and 
1994, employment declined again in 1995-96 due to 
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further tariff reductions and illegal imports. Exports also 
increased, but still account for only 10% of local 
production. 
5.1.2 Economic context for clothing production in the 
Western Cape 
Clothing is a b u y e r - d r i v e n commodity, the organisation 
of the industry, types of inter-firm cooperation, and profit 
levels are primarily determined by the market or, in the 
case of South Africa, by the major retailers, design 
houses, local and foreign buyers (October 1996: 16). 
South African markets are much more developed than 
those in other African countries. Both per capita incomes 
and populations are higher. South Africa's 1995 per 
capita income of US$3,160 was over six times the 
average for Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1997). 
Similarly its population of 41.5 million is second only to 
Nigeria's on the African continent. South Africa's 
superior infrastructure and well-developed retail sector 
also mean that clothing producers can more easily reach 
a national market. 
The si2e of the firms in (his cluster suggest that obvious 
economies of scale have already been realised (See Table 
3.1). The cluster contains a mix of firms of different 
sizes and levels of integration (Wilkens and Kane 1997). 
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The largest share of production and employment is 
concentrated in a few large firms. The twenty largest 
firms have more than 300 workers; 66 firms have 100 
to 300 employees each. At the low end of the cluster 
structure are 146 firms with fewer than five employees 
and 138 with between 5 and 100 workers. Almost half of 
these small firms are sub-contractors. There has been a 
significant increase in the number of home-based CMTs 
in the past five years. 
October (1996: 25) mentions the existence of 'mini 
clusters' of up to 100 small firms within the region. Such 
mini-clusters seem to consist of firms with similar 
specialisations and/or characteristics. 
File basic institutions governing exchange are the same 
as those already described for Port Shepstone. Likewise, 
the relationships between the larger producers and the 
smaller CM'f firms follow the same pattern as in Port 
Shepstone. 
5.1.3 External economies in the Western Cape clothing 
cluster 
External economies in the Western Cape cluster appear 
fairly strong. Eighty percent of firms identified the close 
proximity to retailers, availability of skilled labour, and 
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access to specialised services as advantages to locating in 
the Western Cape (October 1996: 21). Although some 
firms are technologically advanced and even welcome 
others to see it, technological spillovers did not rate 
highly as an advantage of the cluster. 
Access to the market may be the major benefit of 
locating in the Western Cape clothing cluster. Since only 
a small proportion of firms export, access to the retail 
chains that dominate the domestic market is a decided 
benefit for any firm. The headquarters of ail but one of 
these major chains are located in the cluster, as are the 
major mass suppliers to the lower and mid-upper ends of 
the market. The Western Cape cluster is the main 
supplier to these chains. 
The cluster contains nearly 47,000 employees of garment 
firms, and an additional 23,000 workers in related 
industries (October 1996: 7). This certainly seems to be 
a significant pool of labour available to the garment 
industry, it is not, however, clear from the description of 
the cluster what skills these workers have and whether 
skill levels have been increasing. 
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Clothing producers obtained less than one-quarter 
(22.4%) of their intermediate inputs from within the 
region (October 1996). The cluster includes textile firms, 
and a large number of specialist firms linked to the 
clothing industry, such as fabric printers, suppliers of 
trims, and vendors of new and second-hand machinery. 
The introduction of the latest technology in the industry 
has been limited to large- and medium-sized firms who 
have mainly adopted computerised pattern designing, J 
marking, and grading (October 1996). Most small firms, 
on the other hand, have no specialised machinery. The 
closure rate for small firms is also very high, limiting the 
possibility of technological spillovers from the larger 
enterprises. 
A characteristic of the Western Cape Clothing Cluster, 
which sets it apart from many of the enterprise clusters 
discussed in this paper, is the ease with which 
information is disseminated. October (1996: 14) reports J 
that "all firms interviewed had visited other factories to 
look at new tectaote OT different foim of weufe I 
organisation such as just-in-time." One of the large, I 
technologically advanced firms, has an open door policy 
and welcomes a large number of firms to its factories. 
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5.1.4 Joinl action in the Western (.'ape clothing cluster 
The Western Cape cluster has extensive horizontal and 
vertical linkages that have resulted in various (onus of 
joint action. Horizontal co-operation between linns at 
similar stages of the production process is common 
(October 1996: 13-15). f i rms cooperate to handle large 
orders, present joint clothing ranges, share information, 
use marketing agents jointly, and lend machinery. 
Cooperation on producing for the export market is 
growing. The cluster is also characterised by 
specialisation and sub-contracting. Specialised design 
houses, firms specialising in cutting services, and a large 
number of pleating firms have emerged in the last decade 
or so. Sub-contracting in the cluster falls into one of two 
categories: operations which require highly specialised 
equipment and skilled labour, and operations which arc 
simple and labour-intensive. 
1 lorizoiital multilateral co-operation is institutionalised in 
various associations and organisations. There are two 
employer organisations: the Cape Clothing Manufactures 
Association (CCMA) and the Garment Manufacturers 
Association (October 1996: 15) The CCMA represents 
mainly the larger and more established manufacturers In 
1 994, tl had a membership of I OK firms, or 35% ol all 
/ i n n s registered with the Industrial Council. The Garment 
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Manufacturers Association (GMA) represents just over 40 
small firms. Another association, the Mitchells Plain 
Garment Manufacturers Association, has recently 
emerged. The associations are active in industrial 
relations, but they are also attempting to undertake new 
roles, including the screening of foreign exports of 
fabrics and other inputs, small firm development, and the 
dissemination of information. The GMA is frequently 
used as a source of information by manufacturers needing 
specialised CMTs. The relationships formed within the 
association have also led to sharing of orders, passing on 
of work, and sharing of information (October 1996: 16). 
The Western Cape cluster has significant vertical 
linkages. One of the changes in the cluster noted by 
October (1996) was the growing co-operation between 
retailers and manufacturers on clothing design and fabric 
selection. Such bilateral co-operation is accompanied by 
vertical joint action among groups of firms. Groups of 
companies who are not direct competitors use the same 
agent to market their products. These are used mainly by 
the medium-sized companies to obtain orders from 
retailers located outside of Cape Town. A potentially 
more important type of agent has arisen in the export 
market. A number of companies in Cape Town who 
export to Germany are using the same agents. According 
to one of the companies interviewed, these agents play an 
98 
(DSAV'P No. 518 
important role in transferring information, design 
techniques, and ensuring quality standards (October 1996' 
15). 
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5.1.5 The Western Cape Clothing Cluster: Summary and 
conclusions 
Understanding the distribution channels and the role of 
traders are particularly important for analysing the 
Western Cape clothing cluster. Retailers are crucial to the 5 
domestic market and a new type of marketing agent 
could become key to gaining the cluster a place in the 
world market. 
The cluster has over its fairly long history developed 
significant external economies. Location within this 
cluster brings clear benefits of market access, availability 
of intermediate inputs, labour market pooling, and, to a 
lesser extent, technological spillovers. 
Cooperation between large and medium-scale producers 
is beneficial to all, but it appears that small firms in the 
cluster are relegated to low profit activities that give 
them little opportunity to develop. The cluster's external 
economies mainly accrue to the large and medium-scale 
producers, Technological §piHeverS to t t £ potential to j 
be significant, especially since large firms seem very 
willing to share information with one another. 
Small-firm joint action, on the other hand, is weak. The 
main association of smaller firms -- the Garment 
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Manufacturers Association — has only 40 members. A 
second one is forming, but it is localised in (he Mitchell's 
Plain Hive, so it may not have cluster-wide impact. 
Few firms are exporting. Small firms seem least likely to 
enter export markets on their own and may not benefit 
much from doing CMT work for larger exporters. An 
important development in the cluster is the emergence of 
a new type of agent who serves the exporting firms by 
transferring information, disseminating design techniques, 
and ensuring quality. 
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5.2 Fishing and fish processing at Lake Victoria 
Kenya's Lake Victoria fish cluster encompasses large-
scale fish processors and their supply beaches. Most of 
the large-scale processors are located in Kisumu, a large 
town on the shores of the Lake; several others are in 
Nairobi, and two are in other lakeside towns. All produce 
frozen and/or chilled fish fillets mainly for the export 
market. The fish is supplied by traders operating in and 
through some 65 fishing beaches on the Kenyan side of 
the Lake (Ogutu 198S). These can be considered as 
clusters within a cluster. For purposes of understanding 
their structure and dynamics, one was selected for 
intensive investigation (McCormick el al 1995, 1996; 
Mituliah 1996, 1997a, 1997b). That cluster - Uhanya 
Beach — may or may not be representative of the 
population. What is clear is that its structure, linkages, 
and dynamics are such that much can be learned by 
examining the cluster through the lens of collective 
efficiency. 
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5.2.1 History and turning points of the Lake Victoria 
fishing cluster 
Lake Victoria has had a long history of artisanal fishing. 
The Luo people, who live around the Lake, enjoyed fish 
as a part of their normal diet. The Lake had a variety of 
species and artisans caught, processed, and to a limited 
degree, traded many of them. Activity in places like 
Uhanya Beach increased slowly through the 1970s, with 
most of the impetus coming from increased trade for a 
widening local market. 
The early 1980s brought a major change in Lake Victoria 
fisheries. Three factors converged to bring about what 
has been called the Nile Perch boom (Mitullah 1997b). 
The first factor was a virtually untapped supply of large 
fish, the Nile Perch, which British scientists had 
introduced into Lake Victoria in 1954, in order to 
supplement existing fish stocks which were being rapidly 
depleted (Geheb 1997:68-69). The second factor was the 
demand for quality fish by consumers in industrialised 
countries, which continued to grow while fish supplies in 
northern waters dwindled (Jansen 1996). The third 
1 actor, which has been largely overlooked in existing 
studies of this industry, was the presence in Kenya's 
Asian community of both capital and entrepreneurial 
skills (Himbara 1994). The result was the establishment 
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in Kenya of a major fish processing industry that by 
1995 was exporting over 12,000 tonnes of Nile Perch 
valued at US$ 29 million, most of it destined for markets 
in Europe, Japan, Israel, and North America (Kenya 
1995 b) 3 ? 
Fish supplies began to fall in the early 1990s as a result 
of poor Fisheries management. Nevertheless, the industry 
at all levels continued to be profitable, and there seemed 
little cause for concern until, in early 1997, two people 
died in Spain of salmonella poisoning after eating Nile 
Perch imported from Uganda. Spain immediately 
imposed a ban on imports of East African Nile Perch. 
Other European countries followed suit, and then the 
European Union (EU) acted on behalf of all its members 
to ban Nile Perch imports. The effect on Kenya's fish 
industry was immediate and devastating. Factories that 
had been supplying the European market had to cut 
production drastically pending a visit by EU inspectors. 
Prices at the beaches dropped from K.shs 50 per kilo to 
25 per kilo almost over night. When the inspectors came 
to Kenya, they found that the handling of fish was 
unsatisfactory both at the beaches and in the factories. At 
Uhanya Beach, the main problem was the way fish was 
moved from the boats to the factories' refrigerated trucks. 
Fish was often dragged along the ground and then thrown 
on the dirty cement floor of the co-operative's weighing 
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shed or banda. From there, agents of the large-scale 
processors selected the best of the catch and placed them 
on ice in insulated trucks to be transported to the 
factories. The factories themselves were also cited for 
poor sanitation, and the inspectors outlined new 
procedures that had to be followed by processors 
exporting to the EU. 
The response to the shock was mixed. Processors used to 
operating in less fussy markets made few changes as a 
result of the EU inspection visit. Those large-scale 
processors who depended on the European market co-
operated both with the inspectors and the Kenyan health 
authorities to improve conditions within their factories. 
Several made major investments to ensure that they could 
comply with EU standards, and at least one sought and 
obtained ISO 9000 certification. The change in Uhanya 
Beach was dramatic. A visit to the beach in June 1997 
revealed a new banda located only a few metres from the 
water's edge. Fish were being transported suspended 
from poles to ensure that they did not touch the ground. 
Upon reaching the banda, they were washed in 
chlorinated water and placed on a clean surface for 
selection. The fish selected by the factory agent were 
dipped into salted, chlorinated water before being placed 
in the truck. The whole process, including (he investment 
in banda and water treatment facilities, was the result of 
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a collaboration between Uhanya's largest trader and one 
of the large-scale fish processors. 
5.2.2 Economic context for fishing and fish processing 
Most Kenyan Nile perch is destined for the export 
market This market is also the most lucrative. Europe, as 
already indicated, is the most discriminating market. Its 
quality standards are very high, and because Europe is 
now essentially one market, any problem in one country 
quickly spreads to all of the other. Kenyan fish is also 
exported to Japan, Israel, and North America. Most of 
the processors claimed not to know the final destination 
of their fish. Their customers are importers who resell the 
fish to others. Only one of the processors mentioned 
specific uses, such as fast food chains in Japan and 
supermarkets in North America. 
The export market is large. No fish processor reported 
lack of demand. On the contrary, most could sell much 
more, if they could obtain adequate supplies of raw fish. 
The domestic market is both smaller and more diverse. 
Fresh and frozen Nile Perch are sold to hotels, 
institutions, and retailers mainly in Nairobi and the larger 
towns. Artisanally processed fish, which is very popular 
in the western part of Kenya, finds its way to markets 
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throughout the country. Finally, there are markets for 
various fish by-products. The so-called 'fish frames', the 
skeletons remaining after factories complete the filleting 
process, are demanded both by those processing for low-
income consumers and as an input into the fish meal 
animal feed manufactured by several large factories in 
Kenya. The fish bladders are a food delicacy in China, 
and an ingredient in isinglass, a substance used, among 
other things, for making glue and clarifying wine. 
It is difficult to assess the availability of economies of 
scale. Most fish processors were operating under 
capacity, many at only one-third or one-half of potential 
output. This suggests that economies of scale should be 
realisable, although the fact that the larger factories 
tended to operate more than one production line indicates 
that physical scale economies may be quickly reached. 
Export processing may, however, give rise to certain 
managerial economies resulting from the need for 
marketing, financial, and bureaucratic expertise within the 
firm.—$ 
No obvious economies of scope emerged from our 
interviews of the large-scale processors. On the other 
hand, most processors seemed uninterested in the 
possibility of diversifying into products that might offer 
such economies. Only one large firm indicated thai it was 
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considering processing other types of fish, or developing 
new Nile perch products. 
The institutions governing exchange relations generally 
benefit the large scale processors and their agents at the 
expense of the fishermen. Transactions between traders 
and/or agents and the individual fishermen are normally 
in cash. There are, however, some exceptions. Mitullah 
(1997b) reports that Uhanya's largest trader has formal 
arrangements with three factories that guarantee him 
future payment should he supply fish worth more than 
the cash the driver is carrying. 
According to one factory owner, most processors enter 
into a verbal or written agreement with their agents. 
These specify a fixed price, but allow for certain 
variations. One informant described the power of the 
truck drivers who often double as agents: 
Imagine a driver who has six tonnes of 
fish in a seven-tonne truck. When a 
fisherman comes late, the driver says that 
he can only buy at 20 shillings per kilo. 
The driver has been authorised to pay 35 
shillings per kilo, so the difference is his. 
108 
i O S M P No. 518 
Agents do not always honour their agreements. One 
beach ran into serious difficulties when an agent 
defaulted on his contract with a large-scale processor and 
absconded with his cash advance. 
5.2.3 External economies in the Lake Victoria fishing 
cluster 
Market access is an important consideration for fishermen 
and traders operating within Uhanya beach, f ishermen 
who land (heir fish at Uhanya have ready access to the 
daily line of (rucks taking fish lo (he factories and, if 
some or all of their catch on a particular day is not up lo 
factory standards, there are plenty of traders and local 
processors who will buy the 'rejects'. This is no doubt 
the reason why 86.7% of the fishermen interviewed said 
that, if they were forced to relocate they would move to 
another similar cluster. 
Small-scale traders also find Uhanya a convenient 
location. The road is better than the roads to many 
beaches, and the area is served by mutants (public mini-
buses) and buses that enable small-scale traders to move 
quickly to other locations. Most small traders (65.8%) 
fell that they would not obtain the same results in a 
different location. Most of these pointed to market factors 
as the reason why they prefer Uhanya: Uhanya is an 
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active beach and their customers are there. The largest 
traders, on the other hand, were less wedded to Uhanya. 
Although they recognised that Uhanya has 'easy transport 
and a good landing bay', they felt that they could be as 
successful elsewhere as long as there was a good 
transport system. 
Labour market pooling does not seem to be a major 
source of external economies in the cluster. Both fishing 
and fish processing can, according to the respondents, be 
learned in less than two months by even the slowest 
learner. Workers in factories seem to require only 
minimal skills. 
Although some inputs are available within Uhanya, 
fishermen and artisanal processors have to travel as far as 
Kisumu, some 65 km distant, for others. The major 
inputs into factory production are electricity, water, 
chemicals for water treatment and fish sterilisation, fish, 
and packaging materials. Both electricity and water are 
problematic throughout Kenya, forcing business owners 
te invest in W u p telfe, but o f e mpvfe m m to te 
easily available. 
Technological upgrading has taken place in a number of 
factories and at selected beaches as a result of the EU's 
inspection visit. The upgrading of the factories seemed (o 
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happen on a factory-by-factory basis, depending on 
whether the particular producer intended to export to the 
EU. The relative isolation of the factories from each 
other seems to work against any real spillovers. Beach 
upgrading, similar to what happened at Uhanya Beach, 
has taken place at least one other beach Within Uhanya 
Beach, however, we saw no evidence that the improved 
fish handling techniques developed for the new banda 
had been adopted by others in the cluster. 
5.2.4 Joint action among fishermen, traders and fish 
processors 
in this cluster, unlike most of the others we have 
considered, the most significant joint action has been 
vertical. Trading linkages have spawned vertical bilateral 
joint action. Mitullah (1997b) describes a very strong 
vertical linkage between Uhanya Beach and the large-
scale processors that has resulted in the beach upgrading. 
A large trader, responsible for 70% of the fish trade in 
Uhanya, has formal arrangements with three large-scale 
fish processors. This is unusual and, apparently, each 
factory considers this person lo be 'its' agent at Uhanya. 
Working with one of his partners, the trader upgraded the 
fish-handling facilities to enable (he Uhanya cluster to 
continue providing inputs acceptable to the European 
market. 
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Many of the large-scale processors also have strong 
vertical linkages to particular importers in Europe, but 
these linkages apparently did not result in assistance or 
investments to enable the factories to meet EU standards. 
Rather each factory that chose to upgrade its facilities did 
so on its own with internal or borrowed capital. 
On the other hand, little effective horizontal joint action 
exists at any level. More than half (56.7%) of the 
fishermen subcontracted out some service activities such 
as net repair, boat repair, and transport (Mitullah 1997b: 
41). This probably increased efficiency marginally, but 
did not seem to be a major feature of their operations. 
Although 90 per cent of the fishermen belong to the 
Yimbo Fishermen's Co-operative Society (YFCS), nearly 
all felt that it had no role in the two potentially most 
important forms of co-operation: price setting and quality 
control (Mitullah 1997b: 44). Fishermen, aware that the 
cooperative was not benefiting them, registered a parallel 
association in 1993 and started remitting their 
commission to that greup instead of to foe Yiffibo 
Fishermen's Cooperative. In response YFCS officials 
used their political power to force fishermen to pay 
commissions to the cooperative and the new association 
fell dormant. Most fishermen (93.3%) are also members 
of the Uhanya Beach Organisation. This association. 
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however, primarily addressed welfare rather than business 
concerns. 
The large-scale processors have no sectoral organisation. 
The industry is highly competitive, and our interviews 
revealed a great deal of mistrust among the processors. 
None of them believed that an association or other form 
of co-operation would be bcneficial. One even said that 
he often saw one of his competitors near his plant with 
binoculars! Despite this general lack of co-operation, 
business owners did respond when called by government 
health officials to meetings prior to the EU inspection. 
5.2.5 Lake Victoria fishing: Summary and conclusions 
Effective vertical bilateral joint action has. for the 
moment at least, worked in the Lake Victoria fishing 
cluster. Uhanya Beach has been upgraded to the point 
where it can continue to provide fish acceptable to large-
scale processors exporting to the European market. 
Undoubtedly large profits are accruing lo the partners in 
this action: Uhanya's largest trader and the factory he 
worked with. This trader's other partners seem to be 
unknowing free riders, also profiting from the 
investment. It is also true that the action, by restoring 
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fish prices to their pre-shock levels, has preserved 
incomes for over 500 tiny enterprises within Uhanya 
Beach. 
The cluster has been less successful in dealing with the 
continuing problem of dwindling fish supplies. Many of 
the large-scale processors seem to be trying to make up 
for the shortfall by getting fish from other parts of the 
Lake. No one really seems interested in addressing the 
root of the problem which is, according to 
environmentalists and other key informants, overfishing 
and, especially, the practice of taking undersized fish. 
Only one factory considered getting Nile Perch from 
sources outside of Lake Victoria. Such a move would, if 
feasible, benefit the firm in question but the increased 
supply would probably result in lower prices for the Lake 
fishermen. 
Similarly, only one large-scale firm expressed any 
interest in diversifying its products to include either other 
types of fish or higher level processing. It would seem 
that either strategy would remove some of the pressure 
for continually increasing Nile Perch supplies from the 
Lake fisheries, while at the same time allowing large-
scale factories to maintain or increase profits. Here again, 
such strategies would mainly benefit the factories and 
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would run the risk of lowering the prices paid to 
fishermen. 
Fishermen and small-scale traders and processors are 
especially vulnerable because they have no effective 
mechanism for collective action. It would appear that the 
development of the cluster has been accompanied by 
growing income inequality. Large-scale processors and 
traders have prospered while artisanal fishermen and 
processors, and small-scale traders have benefited only 
marginally (Mitullah 1997b: 33). New mechanisms for 
horizontal joint action are evidently needed. Fishermen 
need the freedom to form associations that they believe 
will work for their interests, and to drop out of those that 
provide no benefits. Traders have this freedom and most 
have chosen not to belong to any existing business 
association. Perhaps an investigation into the reasons for 
this would shed further light on the rather complicated 
issue of horizontal linkages among small firms. 
6,0 C o n c l u s i o n s 
This paper began with a question: Is the metalwork 
cluster in Kamukunji, Nairobi, part of Africa's 
industrialisation process? Analysis of (he internal 
workings and external environment of clusters in Africa 
suggests that the answer must be 'yes', but that this is 
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not the end of the story. Enterprise clusters in Africa are 
at very different stages in their development, and their 
ability to contribute to industrialisation varies 
accordingly. 
Clusters can and do further the industrialisation process, 
but they do so in different ways at different stages of 
their development. Those in the first group make their 
contribution mainly by building a productive environment 
that, in some respects at least, prepares the ground for the 
emergence of collective efficiency. The market access 
that is these clusters' only significant external economy 
allows firms to produce their goods in quantity. Some 
may then make the transition to factory production, 
while others combine craft methods with increasing 
mechanisation. Opportunities to develop basic skills exist 
within many of the enterprises and, although the presence 
of many trainees may lead to excessive competition, in 
the short run it enhances firm incomes and adds to 
production. The fact that the firms are geographically 
clustered encourages associational activity to begin. It is 
iio coincidence that a§§ocjaijopS jfl gueil Olll§fgF§ Ugl i fy 
focus on efforts to improve working conditions within 
the cluster or gain access to needed supplies. 
Infrastructure, especially water, electricity, and access 
roads are the most basic needs of industrial production. 
Without them, these clusters arc unlikely to move ahead. 
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The presence of intermediate input suppliers within the 
cluster is less critical, but easy availability of supplies 
can make a big difference to the efficiency of very small 
producers. 
The second group of clusters already has much clearer 
signs of emerging collective efficiency. These clusters are 
already industrialising, but remain limited by the weak 
technology of most of the firms and the frequent 
sidetracking of associational activity. Firm sizes in these 
clusters are similar to the first group, but the greater 
specialisation and differentiation of firms leads to 
bilateral production linkages and, ultimately, to higher 
efficiency. Higher level technologies in at least some of 
the firms sets the stage for positive technological 
spillovers. In cases where basic infrastructura! and input 
needs have been met. Associations can begin to deal with 
issues of markets and technology. 
The Western Cape clothing cluster and the Lake Victoria 
fish cluster include large as well as small and medium-
size firms. They aim for wider markets, both national and 
foreign, and are generally able to produce competitively. 
1 lere, however, the resemblance between them ends. The 
Western Cape cluster is really an emerging industrial 
district, while the Lake Victoria cluster hovers just above 
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the small enterprise clusters. The Western Cape cluster is 
situated squarely within the industrialisation process. 
Market access, labour market pooling, intermediate input 
effects, and technological spillovers are all present and 
positive. The cluster is characterised by extensive and 
varied linkages -- bilateral and multilateral, vertical and 
horizontal — that result in joint action in production and 
on key issues affecting the cluster. The greatest need in 
this cluster and others like it is for continuing market 
analysis, focused particularly on the export market, and 
for upgrading the small-firm segment of the cluster to 
encourage more equal sharing of benefits. The existing 
Associations can probably handle the first task, but the 
small firms may need the assistance of government or 
NGOs in their efforts to strengthen their position. 
The Lake Victoria cluster, on the other hand, is fragile. 
J l has weathered an important storm in the EU quality 
shock, but its lack of ongoing mechanisms for joint 
action as well as the large firms' concentration on only 
1wo fish products raise questions about its ability to 
.syryjye yyer the Jciflg term Furthermore, the unequal 
power relations between the fishermen on the one hand, 
and the large traders and processors on the other, mean 
that even when the cluster prospers, benefits are not well 
shared. Furthermore, the challenge of dwindling fish 
supplies has not been adequately dealt with. All of these 
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problems suggest that those concerned need to work 
together. This will probably require new organisations or 
a complete overhaul of existing ones. 
Supporting enterprise clusters may not result in 
industrialisation tomorrow. But informed support, that 
recognises that clusters have different needs at different 
stages of development will probably help it to happen 
sooner rather than later. This is an important finding for 
associations, governments, donors, and those businesses 
that make clusters their home. 
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NOTES 
1. This paper is one of the outputs of tire Kenya 
portion of a larger project on Collective. Efficiency 
and Small-scale Industry, directed by Hubert 
Schmuz of the Institute oi Development Studies 
at the University of' Sussex, and funded by the 
Department T;or: International Development, 
London. The author is;grateful to Hubert Schmky 
for his patient leadership m the project and his 
insightful comments, both of which have helped 
to shape our work in Kenya. She is also grateful 
to the many other people who provided valuable 
comments on this particular paper: Raphie 
Kaplinsky, Patrick Alii a, Poul Ovc Pedersen, 
John .Humphrey, Hermine Weijland, Catherine 
Masmcie, Brian O'Riordan, Khalid Nadvi, 
Winnie Mitullah, and Mary Kinyanjui. Finally, 
she thanks the staff of the Institute for 
Development Studies. University of Nairobi, for 
fe I s g M i a l aipport iliathas matte fee work run 
smoothly, 
2. Jua kali, the Swahili words for 'hot sun', was 
originally used to refer to artisanal manufacturing 
and repair businesses that operate without shelter, 
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but lias gradually broadened to cover many types 
of small enterprises. 
The literature on networks and linkages in 
business is large and growing. Useful summaries 
are contained in Mead (1994) and McCormick 
and Atieno (1997). 
Information in this paragraph was collected by the 
author in November 1997. 
Based on an interview with (he secretary of the 
Kamukunji Jua Kali Association, November 
1997. 
Field notes of personal i,nter.vie.\y; with fpunqler of 
Kamukunji Jua Kali Blacksmith and Tinsmith 
Society; 19 June 1986. 
Field notes of personal interview with founder of 
Kamukunji Jua Kali Blacksmith and Tinsmith 
Society, 19 June 1986. See also King (1996). 
This section is based on an interview in 
November 1997 with an artisan who was among 
the First to make wheelbarrows in Kamukunji in 
1984. 
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From field notes of interview with Kamukunji 
Jua Kali Blacksmith and Tinsmith Society, 19 
June 1986. 
Maialus are small public transport vehicles. In 
Thika and other up-country areas, most are 11-14 
passenger vans or converted pick-up trucks. On 
many Nairobi routes, larger mini-buses with up to 
30 seats are used. 
These averages were calculated from grouped 
data in Dawson (1988: 15). 
Cushion makers are one of the eleven repair 
specialisations, but their data are included with 
manufacturing. 
Values stated in Kenya shillings have been 
converted to US dollars at a rate of K.shs.51.4 to 
one dollar. This is the mean of monthly rates for 
1995 as reported in The Monthly Economic 
Review for September 1996 (Central Bank of 
Kenya 19%). 
See Penrose (1959: 92ff) for a discussion of 
managerial economies of size and growth. 
122 
tDS/WP 518 
R E F E R E N C E S 
Alila, Patrick O. and McConnick, Dorothy. 1997. "Finn Linkages 
irt Kenya's Tourism Sector." Paper prepared as part of 
the hiuiti-covnlry Study of Private Enterprise 
Development, Kenya Cose Sludy. Nairobi: University of 
Nairobi. Institute for Development Studies 
Anderson, Gary. 1994. "Industry Clustering for Economic 
Development." Economic Development Review Spring 
1994: 26-32 
Barr, Abigail M. 1995. "The Missing Factor: Entrepreneurial 
Networks, Enterprises and Economic Growth in Ghana." 
Centre for the Study of African Economies Working 
Paper WPS/95-11. Oxford: University of Oxford, CSAE 
Publishing. 
Biggs, Tyler: Moody, Gail R.; van Leeuwen, Jan-Hendrik; and 
While. E. Diane. 1994. Africa Can Compete: Export 
Opportunities and Challenges for Garments and Home 
Products in the US Market. World Bank Discussion Paper 
No. 242, Africa Technical Department. Washington: The 
World Bank. 
Biggs, Tyler; Miller, Margaret; Otto, Caroline; and Tyler, Geraid. 
1996. Africa Can Compete: Export Opportunities and 
Challenges for Garments and Home Products in the 
European Market. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 300, 
Africa Technical Department. Washington: The World 
Bank. 
123 
tDS/WP 518 
Borrows, Sally. 1992. "The Role of Indigenous NGOs in the 
Development of Small Town Enterprises in Ghana." In 
Jonathan Baker and Poul Ove Pedersen, eds„ The Rural-
Urban Interface in A frica: Expansion and Adaptation. 
Uppsaia: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 
Central Bank of Kenya. 1996. Monthly Economic Review. 
September. 
Coase, R.H. 1937. " The Nature of the Firm." Economica Nov 
-1937, 386-405. 
Cortes, Mariluz; Berry, Albert; and Ishaq, Ashfaq. 1987. Success 
in Smalt and Medium-Scale Enterprises: Evidence from 
Colombia. New York: Oxford University Press (for the 
World Bank). 
Dawson, Jonathan. 1988. "Small-scale Industry Development in 
Ghana: A Case Study of Kumasi." (For presentation to 
ESCOR, Overseas Development Administration, London) 
Dawson, Jonathon. 1992. "The Relevance of the Flexible 
Specialisation Paradigm for Small-Scale Industrial 
Restructuring in Ghana." IDS Bulletin 23 (3), 34-38. 
l• a)champs, J&fiarce), I he Enforcement of Commercial 
Contracts in Ghana." World Development 24 (3): 
427-448. 
Frijns, Jos; Kinii, Paul; Malombe, Joyce; and van Vliet, Bas. 
1997. Pollution Control of Small-scale Metal Industries 
in Nairobi. Nairobi: Mousing and Building Research 
124 
I D S A V P 5 1 8 
Institute. 
Geheb. Kim. 1997. "The Regulators and the Regulated- f isheries 
Management, Options and Dynamics in Kenya ' s Lake 
Victoria Fishery." Ph.D. Thesis, School of African and 
Asian Studies, University of Sussex. 
Haan, Hans Christiaan. 1995. "Informal Sector Associations in 
Africa." TOOLConsnlt Working Paper No. I. 
Amsterdam: TOOL Consult B.V. 
Hart, Marion 1994. "Study to Profile .Jua Kali Associations 
Relevant to the FIT Programme." Farm Implements and 
Tools (FIT). Nairobi. 
Hewitt. Tom; Johnson. Hazel; and Wield, Dave. 1992. 
Industrialisation and Development. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Himbara, David. 1994. Kenyan Capitalists, the Slate, and 
Development. Nairobi. Fast African Educational 
Publishers 
Humphrey, John. 1995. "Industrial Reorganisation in Developing 
Countries; From Models to Trajectories." World 
Development 23 (I ): 149-162 
Humphrey, John and Schmitz, Hubert. 1996. "Trust and Economic 
Development." IDS Discussion Paper No. 355, IDS 
Sussex. 
Jansen, Eirik G. 1996. "Rich Fisheries - Poor Fisher Folk: The 
Effects of Trade and Aid m the Lake Victoria Fisheries." 
1 2 5 
JDS/WP 518 
SUM W . P N o . 1996.7. Oslo: University of Oslo, Centre 
for Development and Environment (SUM). 
Kamukunji. 1994. "Profile of Kamukunji Jua Kali Association" 
Draft. 
Kenya. 1986 Economic Management for Renewed Growth. 
Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986. Nairobi: Government 
Printer. 
Kenya. 1988. Development Plan, 1989-1993. Nairobi: 
Government Printer. 
Kenya. 1992a. Economic Survey 1992. Nairobi; Government 
Printer. 
Kenya. 1992b. Smalt Enterprise and Jua Kali Development in 
Kenya. Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1992 Nairobi: 
Government Printer. 
Kenya. 1995a. Statistical Abstract 1995. Nairobi; Government 
Printer. 
Kenya. 1995b. Fisheries Annual Statistical Bulletin, Ministry of 
Tourism and Wildlife. 
Kenya. 1995c. Economic Survey 1995. Nairobi: Government 
Printer. 
Kenya. 1996, Industrial Transformation to the Year 2020. 
Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996. Nairobi: Government 
Printer. 
i 26 
IDS/WP 518 
Kina. Kenneth 1996 Jua Kali Kenya: Change A Development 
in an Informal Economy, 1970-95. Nairobi: East Afr ican 
Educational Publishers. 
Kinyanjui, Mary Njeri . 1996. "Ziwani and Kigandaini Jua Kali 
Enterprise Clusters: Geographical Proximity or Col lect ive 
Eff ic iency." IDS Working Paper No. 508. Nairobi . 
Institute for Development Studies 
Kinyanjui, Mary Njeri . 1997. "Tapping Opportunities in Enterprise 
Clusters in Kenya: The Case of Enterprises in Ziwani and 
Kigandaini." Paper prepared for research project on 
Collective Efficiency and Small Enterprise in Kenya ;md 
presented at Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 
UK. Nairobi: University of Nairobi, Institute for 
Development Studies. 
Kinyanjui , Mary Njeri . 1998. "Vehicle Repair Clusters in Kenya: 
Alternative Strategies for Slowly Industrialising 
Countries." Report prepared for research project on 
Collective Efficiency and Small Enterprise in Kenya. 
Nairobi: University of Nairobi,-Institute for Development 
Studies. 
Langlois, Richard N„ and Robertson, Paul. 1995. Firms, Markets, 
and Economic Change: A Dynamic Theory of Business 
Institutions. London: Rout ledge. 
Little, Ian M.D.; Mazumdar , Dipak; Page, John M Jr. 1987. Small 
Manufacturing Enterprises: A Comparat ive Analysis of 
Ind ia and Other Economies. New York: Oxford 
I Jniverxity Press. 
1 2 7 
t D S / W P 5 1 8 
Macharia, Kinuthia. 1993. "The Informal African City and the 
Development of Jua Kali Associations: Whilher Way?" 
IDS Working Paper no. 492. Nairobi: University of 
Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies. 
Marshall, Alfred. 1890. Principles of Economics. London: 
Macmillan & Co, 
McCormick, Dorothy. 1988. "Small Enterprise in Nairobi: Golden 
Opportunity or Dead End? Ph.D. dissertation. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University. 
McCormick, Dorothy. 1992. "Why Small Firms Stay Small: Risk 
and Growth in Nairobi 's Small-scale Manufacturing." IDS 
Working paper No.483. Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 
Institute for Development Studies. 
McCormick, Dorothy. 1996. "Policies Affecting Kenyan 
Industrialisation, 1964-1994." Paper presented at a 
seminar entitled From Sessional Paper No. 10 to the Era 
of Structural Adjustment: Towards Indigenising the Policy 
Debate. Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis and 
Research. 
McCormick, Dorothy. 1997. "Industrial District or Garment 
Ghetto? Nairobi's Mini-Manufacturers. In Metne Pieter 
van Dijk and Roberta Rabellotti, eds. Enterprise Clusters 
anil Networks in Developing Countries. London: Frank 
Cass. 
McComiick, Dorothy. 1998. "Enterprise Clusters in Africa: From 
Collective Efficiency to Industrialisation." Report 
prepared as part of a research project on Collective 
128 
IDSAVP 518 
Efficiency and Small Enterprise in Kenya. Nairobi: 
University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies. 
McCormick, Dorothy; Kinvanjui, Maty N.; and Ongile, Grace. 
1994. "Growth and Barriers to Growth Among Nairobi 's 
Small and Medium-Sized Garment Producers." Final 
Report to International Centre for Economic Growth, 
Nairobi 
McCormick, Dorothy; Kinyanjui, Mary Njeii; and Mitullah, 
Winnie V. 1995. "Collective Efficiency and Small 
Enterprise in Kenya: A Proposal to Study (he Vehicle 
Repair and Fish Processing Industries." IDS Working 
Paper No. 503. Nairobi: University of Nairobi, Institute 
for Development Studies. 
McCormick, Dorothy; Ktnyanjui, Maty Njeri; and Mituliah, 
Winnie. 1996. "Small Enterprise Clusters: Fishing and 
Vehicle Repair in Kenya." Paper prepared for research 
project on Collective Efficiency and Small Enterprise in 
Kenya and presented at Institute of Development Studies, 
Sussex, UK. Nairobi: University of Nairobi, institute for 
Development Studies. 
McCormick, Dorothy, and Atieno, Rosemary. 1997. "Firm 
Linkages: Importance for Industrial Structure and 
Performance." Paper presented at National Workshop on 
Multi-Country Study of Private Enterprise Development 
Nairobi: University of Nairobi. Institute for Development 
Studies. 
129 
tDS/WP 518 
McCormick, Dorothy; Kinyanjui, Mary N,; and Ongile, Grace. 
1997. ' 'Growth and Barriers to Growth Among Nairobi 's 
Small and Medium-Sized Garment Producers." World 
Development 25(7): 1095-1110. 
Mead, Donald C. 1994. "Linkages Within the Private Sector: A 
Review of Current Thinking." FIT Working Paper No. 3. 
Geneva: International Labour Office. 
Mishan, E.J. 1971. "The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An 
Interpretive Essay." Journal of Economic Literature 9 
(1): 1-28. 
Mituilah, Winnie V. 1996. "Collective Efficiency in the Fish 
Industry: Lessons from Uhanya Beach Census." IDS 
Working Paper No. 509. Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 
Institute for Development Studies. 
Mituilah, Winnie V. 1997a. "Firm interactions in Uhanya Cluster: 
The Dynamics of Small Scale Fish Processing." Paper 
prepared for research project on Collective Efficiency and 
Small Enterprise in Kenya and presented at Institute of 
Development Studies, Sussex, UK. Nairobi: University of 
Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, 
Mituilah, Winnie V. 1997b. "Fishing and Processing Cluster in 
Lalce V ictoria." Report prepared for research project on 
Collective Efficiency and Small Enterprise in Kenya. 
Nairobi: University of Nairobi, Institute for Development 
Studies. 
130 
tDS/WP 518 
Nadvi, Khaiid. 1997. "The Cutting Edge: Collective Efficiency 
and International Competitiveness in Pakistan." IDS 
Discussion Paper No. 360. Sussex: Institute of 
Development Studies. 
Nadvi, Khaiid, and Schnutz, Hubert. 1994. "Industrial Clusters in 
Less Developed Countries: Review of Experiences and 
Research Agenda." IDS Discussion Paper no. 339. 
Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. 
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
October, Lionel. 1996. "Sectors, Clusters and Regions : A Study 
of the Cape Clothing! Industry." Working Paper No. 
2,. Capetown: University of Cape Town, Development 
Policy Research Unit. 
Ogutu, G.E.M. (ed.) 1988. Artisanal Fisheries of Lake Victoria, 
Kenya: Options for Management, Production, and 
Marketing. Nairobi: Sirikon Publishers and IDRC. 
Ongile, Grace and McCormick, Dorothy. 1996. "Barriers to Small 
Firm Growth: Evidence from Nairobi's Garment 
Industry." In Dorothy McCormick and Poul Ove 
Pedersen, eds.. Small Enterprises: Flexibility and 
Networking in an African Context. Nairobi: Longhorn. 
Pedersen, Poul Ove. 1993. "Clothing Rural Zimbabwe Sectoral 
Strategies and Local Development." CDR Working Paper 
93.7. Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research. 
131 
tDS/WP 518 
Pedersen, Pou! Ove. 1997. "Clusters of Enterprises Within 
Systems of Production and Distribution: Collective 
Efficiency and Transaction Costs." In Meine Pieter van 
Dijk and Roberta Rabellotti, eds. Enterprise Clusters and 
Networks in Developing Countries. London: Frank Cass 
Penrose, Edith T. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Piore, M.J.; Sabei, C.F. 1984. The Second Industrial Divide: 
Possibilities for Prosperity. New York: Basic books, Inc. 
Porter, Michael. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and 
Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Porter, Michael. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. 
New York: The Free Press. 
Powell, J.W. 5986. 'Handbook on the Operations of the ETTU." 
Accra: Ministry of industries. 
Pryor, Frederick. 1972. "The Size of Production Establishments in 
Manufacturing." Economic Journal 82:547-66. 
Riedel, Mrgen and Schmitz, Hubert. 1989. Grass-Root 
Industrialisation in a Ghanaian Town. Munch en: 
Weltforum Verlag. 
Scherer, F.M, 1980. Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance. Second Edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
132 
tDS/WP 518 
Schmiiz, Hubert. 1992. "On the Clustering of Small f i rms . " IDS 
Bulletin 23 (3): 64-69. 
Schmitz, Hubert. 1993. "Small Shoemakers and Eordist Giants: 
Tale of a Supercluster." IDS Discussion Pnpcr no. 331 
Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. 
Schmitz, Hubert. 1995. "Collective Efficiency: Growth Path for 
Small-Scale Industry." Journal of Development Studies 
31 (4): 529-566. 
Schmitz, Hubert. 1997. "Collective Efficiency and Increasing 
Returns." IDS Working Paper 50. Susse.v: Institute of 
Development Studies. 
Storper, Michael; Walker, Richard I9S9 The Capitalist 
Imperative: Territory, Technology, and industrial 
Growth. New York and Oxford: Basil Blackwcll. 
Sverrisson, Ami. 1990. "Entrepreneurship and Industrialisation: A 
Case Study of Carpenters in Mutate, Zimbabwe." 
Research Policy Studies, Discussion Paper No. 186. 
Lund: University of Lund, Research Policy Institute. 
Sverrisson, Ami. 1992a. "Innovation as a Collective Enterprise: A 
Case Study of Carpenters in Naktiru, Kenya." Research 
Policy Studies, Discussion Paper No. 189. Lund: 
University of Lund, Research Policy Institute. 
Sver r i s son , Ami. 1992b. "Flexible Specialisation and 
Woodworking Enterprises in Kenya and Zimbabwe." IDS 
Bulletin 23 (3): 28-34. 
133 
t D S / W P 518 
Undugu Design Unit. 1995. "Scrap Metal Recycling, a Product 
Development Oriented Study of the informal 
Metalworking Sector: Case Study of Kamukunji Jua 
Kali." Nairobi; Undugu Society of Kenya. 
Visser, Evert-Jan. 1996. "Local Sources of Competitiveness: 
Spatial Clustering and Organisational Dynamics in Small-
Scaie Clothing in Lima, Peru." Amsterdam: Thesis 
Publishers. 
Wiikens, Nick and Kane, Kevin. 1997. "SMME Linkages and 
Industrial Clustering in South Africa." Paper presented at 
conference on African Business Systems: Institutionalising 
Industrialisation in the Era of Economic Reform, 
Mombasa, Kenya. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism. New York: 1'he Free Press. 
World Bank. 1997. World Development Report 1997: The State 
in a Changing World. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Zeitlin, J. (ed.) 1989. "Local Industrial Strategies." Special Issue 
of a£cw/o/h )»rt nd Spc ietj> 18(4). 
Zucker, Lynne G. 1986. "Production of Trust: institutional 
Sources of Economic Structure, 1840-1920." Research in 
Organizational Behaviour 8: 53-11 1. 
134 
